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September 11, 2026

Clifton Cislak

Clerk

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

Re: Supplemental Authorities in *In Re Media and Democracy Project* (D.C. Cir. No. 26-1183)

Dear Mr. Cislak:

The following supplemental authorities concern the mandamus petition filed July 14, 2026. They support the arguments — in the petition and supporting amicus brief — that the FCC is evading judicial review by having Media Bureau subordinates decide the merits of the disputed licensing issues and refusing to issue a full-Commission final order. Pet. 28-29; Am. Br. 1-9.


First, in *ABC v. FCC*, 1:26-cv-2902 (D.D.C.), the FCC recently refuted the same disparate treatment argument pressed in the pending mandamus petition, by asserting that the Media Bureau correctly decided the merits of the Fox licensing issues (based upon a fulsome record). Ex. A 31-33; Pet. 16-20. Given its publicly-pronounced position that the Media Bureau decision was correct and justified by a well-developed record, the agency cannot legitimately refuse to memorialize that position in a full-Commission final order. And the Commission has no excuse for waiting to draft an accompanying opinion. The Commission can issue the order “without specifying any reasons therefor.” 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(5).

Second, in *Brown v. FCC*, 26-1785 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026), the Fourth Circuit addressed concerns that the agency was dictating substantive policy through a Media Bureau decision while circumventing judicial review through inaction by the full Commission. The Court ruled that there was a constructive final order subject to judicial review. Ex. B. Judge Wynn’s concurrence characterized the FCC’s approach as “jurisdictional gamesmanship”

that would “give agencies the unfettered ability to avoid judicial review.” Ex. B 31, 33-34. Dissenting, Judge Wilkinson disagreed on finality but shared the “reasonable concern” that the agency could attempt to “evade review of an unlawful decision” by “never act[ing] on an application for review.” Ex. B 48. Judge Wilkinson’s answer to that problem was a mandamus petition like the one here. *Id.*

The Supreme Court later stayed the Fourth Circuit’s decision, ruling preliminarily that there was no judicially-reviewable final order. Ex. C. The Court did not address the foregoing gamesmanship concerns but explained that the full Commission has a mandatory duty to “resolve every application [for review] it receives.” Ex. C 3. Petitioner requests this Court to enforce that duty through mandamus.

Sincerely,



Daniel G. Jarcho

Counsel for Petitioner

cc: counsel of record (via CM/ECF)
Matthew DelNero



EXHIBIT A

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICAN BROADCASTING
COMPANIES, INC. *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 26-2902 (LLA)

**DEFENDANTS' COMBINED
MOTION TO DISMISS, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY RELIEF, AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

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The Federal Communication Commission and the remaining Defendants hereby oppose Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion ("PI Mot.," Dkt. 2) and respectfully move this Court to dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. 1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from an investigation of the FCC's Enforcement Bureau into allegations of unlawful discrimination by The Walt Disney Company ("Disney"), including by means of company-wide policies and practices governing its subsidiaries American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. ("ABC") and eight ABC owned and operated broadcast television stations ("Disney ABC stations" or "stations"). A year into that investigation, Disney's responses to Commission information requests were deficient and nonresponsive. So, on April 28, 2026, the Commission's Media Bureau issued an order directing the stations to apply for renewal of their licenses early, as is allowed in service of investigations under a longstanding Commission rule. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 73.3539(c).

The license renewal proceeding has generated a voluminous record, which consists of public comments both for and against renewal, including submissions relevant to the FCC's discrimination investigation. The Commission is now analyzing that record, as well as Disney's responses to the Enforcement Bureau's inquiries. If, on review of those materials, the Commission determines that the license renewal criteria are satisfied, it will grant the stations' applications. If instead the record raises "substantial and material questions of fact" as to whether renewal would serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity," or if the Commission is otherwise unable to make a public interest finding (for example, because of serious or repeated violations of the communications laws), the statute would require additional process—namely, a hearing on the applications. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (d), (e), (k).

The Commission's Chairman has repeatedly emphasized that, although the allegations against Disney are serious, he and the agency remain "open-minded," have "not made a decision," and are "going to follow the facts and the law wherever they [lead]." Ex. 1, David Shepardson, *FCC Chair Says All Options Remain on Table in ABC License Review*, Reuters, at 3 (June 25, 2026) (attached). And the renewal process in progress does not abridge or otherwise affect Plaintiffs' rights. Licensees with pending renewal applications are entitled to continue operating without interruption during the license period for the duration of the renewal proceeding—even were it to result in a hearing. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1), (c)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 1.62. In fact, even if the Commission were to deny the stations' applications, their licenses would remain in effect for however long they might wish to seek judicial review. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(3).

Plaintiffs are not content to let the Commission's ordinary investigative processes (and, if needed, ordinary processes of judicial review) run their course. They instead ask this Court to halt the license renewal proceeding in its tracks by issuing a preliminary injunction preventing the Commission from designating the matter for hearing—regardless what the evidence may show and before anyone would have seen the basis for such action. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 51.¹ Granting Plaintiffs' request would mean taking administrative processes off the table before the Commission has seen and analyzed the voluminous evidence. This would only hobble the Commission's efforts to investigate and resolve serious allegations that Disney has engaged in unlawful discrimination, and from otherwise ensuring that Disney's stations are serving the public interest. Plaintiffs, in return, would only free themselves from the burdens of proving their case in administrative proceedings.

¹ All pin cites are to the ECF-generated page numbers, appearing in blue color at the top, right corner of each page.

Plaintiffs have not justified such “extraordinary” relief. *Winter v. NRDC*, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). They are unlikely to prevail on the merits because this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Congress has limited judicial review of Commission orders to the federal courts of appeals, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), and for many categories of licensing orders, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b). Under a well-established line of decisions beginning with *Telecomms. Rsch. and Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC)*, 750 F.2d 70, 75-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984), these statutory claims-channeling provisions deprive district courts of federal-question jurisdiction in FCC cases—even where, as here, the agency has not yet issued any final, reviewable order. Plaintiffs cannot bypass these jurisdictional limits by framing their claim as one for “retaliation” in response to speech protected by the First Amendment. That theory requires them to show that “but for” animus toward Plaintiffs’ speech, the Commission would not have initiated the early renewal proceeding. Abundant evidence belies that conclusion; it was Disney’s lack of cooperation with the antidiscrimination inquiry that triggered the need for that additional investigatory step.

Nor have Plaintiffs satisfied the other requirements for an injunction. Their claim of irreparable harm from retaliation fails for the same reasons they are unlikely to prevail on the merits of that claim. In addition, they have shown (at most) minimal and self-inflicted effects on speech, and no harms that could justify a preliminary injunction.

The balance of equities and the public interest just as clearly weigh against enjoining the Commission’s investigation. Broadcasters are highly regulated parties subject to the Commission’s comprehensive oversight. Licenses grant them exclusive access—awarded for free—to highly valuable portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, an important and finite public resource. In return for that public benefit, Congress has required broadcasters to operate in the

public interest. To foreclose the Commission from using all the tools at its disposal to investigate whether Plaintiffs are meeting their statutory and regulatory duties would seriously harm both the government and the public. Those harms outweigh the comparatively minor injuries Plaintiffs attempt to show, particularly because the Communications Act ensures they may continue operating as usual while the Commission’s investigation unfolds.

BACKGROUND

I. Statutory and Regulatory Framework.

A. Broadcast Licensing.

Congress established the Commission “to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,” communications over “wire and radio”—“without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.” 47 U.S.C. § 151. To that end, because broadcast television and radio transmissions require access to “radio” spectrum, awarding broadcast licenses is among the Commission’s core functions. *See id.* §§ 303, 307, 309.

Spectrum is a valuable, finite public resource. And broadcast licenses confer exclusive access (for designated locations and frequency ranges) to that public resource for free. Courts accordingly recognize that “the award of a broadcast license should be a ‘public trust.’” *Off. of Comm’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC*, 707 F.2d 1413, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Consistent with that recognition, and with the Commission’s duty to guard against unlawful discrimination, 47 U.S.C. § 151, the agency’s rules set forth antidiscrimination obligations for broadcasters. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(a). Broadcasters have additional public interest obligations as well, including requirements to maintain public inspection files; a duty to provide equal opportunity for airtime to political candidates; and responsibilities not to engage in news distortion, broadcast hoaxes, or indecent broadcasting. *See, e.g., Ex. 2, FCC Reminds Broadcasters of Their*

Public Interest Obligations, DA 26-530, at 5-6 (May 28, 2026) (“May 28 Public Notice,” attached, collecting these requirements).

Under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Commission “shall grant” radio licenses, including for broadcast television stations, only if doing so would serve the “public convenience, interest, or necessity.” 47 U.S.C. § 307(a). Likewise, broadcast licenses may be renewed only “if the Commission finds that [the] public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby,” and other necessary requirements are satisfied. *Id.* § 307(c)(1); *see also id.* § 309(a), (k). It is well settled that “a license renewal will not be deemed to be in the public interest if a licensee has engaged in intentional employment discrimination” on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religious affiliation. *Beaumont Branch of the NAACP v. FCC*, 854 F.2d 501, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1988); *accord Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC*, 595 F.2d 621, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); *see also Review of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies*, 17 FCC Rcd 24018, 24036 ¶ 46 (2002) (“[a] documented pattern of intentional discrimination would put seriously into question a licensee’s character qualifications to remain a licensee” (alteration in original; quoting *Bilingual Bicultural Coal.*, 595 F.2d at 629)).

When “the licensee of a broadcast station submits an application to the Commission for renewal of such license, the Commission shall grant the application if it finds” that three conditions are satisfied:

- (A) the station has served the public interest, convenience, and necessity;
- (B) there have been no serious violations by the licensee of [the Communications Act] or the rules and regulations of the Commission; and
- (C) there have been no other violations by the licensee of [the Communications Act] or the rules and regulations of the Commission which, taken together, would constitute a pattern of abuse.

47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1). “Any party in interest” with administrative standing may oppose a renewal application (and any license application) by “fil[ing] with the Commission a petition to deny.” *Id.* § 309(d)(1); *see also* 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584. The Commission’s rules allow for responses to such petitions, and also for replies. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584(b). In addition, the Commission accepts informal comments that support or oppose broadcast license applications. Ex. 3, FCC, License Renewal Applications for Television Broadcast Stations (attached); *see* 47 C.F.R. § 73.3587 (informal objections).

After a public notice period of at least thirty days (and, for license renewal applications, no fewer than thirty days before expiration of the current license term) the Commission “shall grant” applications where it has determined that doing so would serve the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a); *see also id.* §§ 307(d), 309(a), (b), (k). If the Commission is unable to reach that determination, however—including because “a substantial and material question of fact” is presented concerning whether the applicant has met the requirements for renewal—the agency must “formally designate the application for hearing.” *Id.* § 309(e); *see also id.* § 309(k)(3). If a hearing is designated, the “matters and things in issue” will be specified with “particularity,” and it will be a “full hearing” in which the applicant and all other parties in interest “shall be permitted to participate.” *Id.* § 309(e).

While a renewal application is pending, the broadcast licensee’s existing license “continue[s] . . . in effect.” *Id.* § 307(c)(3). The period during which the existing license remains in effect includes the time needed for “any administrative or judicial hearing and final decision on” the renewal application, including “the disposition of any petition for rehearing pursuant to [47 U.S.C. §§ 402 and 405].” *Id.* If renewal proceedings do not prolong the existing license

period, broadcast licenses (other than initial licenses) ordinarily expire after a term of eight years. *See id.* § 307(c)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1020(a).

The default eight-year license term, however, is not unalterable. *See* 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(c)(1), 309(k)(2). In fact, the Communications Act bars the Commission from “adopt[ing] or follow[ing] any rule which would preclude it . . . from granting or renewing a license for a shorter period . . . if, in its judgment, the public interest, convenience or necessity would be served by” a shorter term. *Id.* Of particular relevance here, a longstanding FCC rule provides that licensees may be required to apply for renewal ahead of the default schedule “[w]henever the FCC regards [the] application . . . as essential to the proper conduct of a hearing or investigation.” 47 C.F.R. § 73.3539(c).

B. Investigatory Power.

The Communications Act grants the Commission full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning which complaint is authorized to be made, to or before the Commission by any provision of [the Act], or concerning which any question may arise under any provisions of [the Act], or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions [of the Act].

47 U.S.C. § 403. This authority “embrace[s] an investigation aimed at the prevention or disclosure of practices contrary to the public interest.” *Stahlman v. FCC*, 126 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1942); *see also id.* at 128 (“The Commission’s right to grant licenses or to revoke licenses in the public interest . . . implies the grant of all means necessary or appropriate to the discharge of the powers expressly granted.”).

C. Judicial Review of FCC Orders.

Under the Communications Act and the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351—commonly known as the “Hobbs Act”—judicial review of FCC actions is limited to final orders of the Commission. *See id.* §§ 2342(1), 2344; 47 U.S.C. § 402. Review of most

Commission orders is governed by the Hobbs Act, which grants exclusive jurisdiction to any United States Court of Appeals other than the Federal Circuit. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). For a narrower category of mostly licensing-related Commission orders, the Communications Act limits judicial review exclusively to the D.C. Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b). These claims-channeling provisions foreclose district court review of “any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court’s future jurisdiction.” *TRAC*, 750 F.2d at 78. That principle applies even before there is any final, reviewable agency order. *See id.* at 75-79.

II. The Disney Antidiscrimination Investigation.

In early 2025, following a series of public reports and allegations of racially or otherwise discriminatory practices at Disney, the FCC’s Chairman directed the Enforcement Bureau to open an investigation into whether Disney was complying with the Commission’s antidiscrimination requirements. *See* Ex. 4, Letter from Chairman Brendan Carr, FCC, to Ranking Member Yvette Clarke, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, at 4 (May 29, 2026) (“Letter to Rep. Clarke”). Chairman Carr advised Disney of this investigation on March 27, 2025. *See* Ex. 5, Letter from Chairman Brendan Carr, FCC, to Chief Executive Officer Robert A. Iger, Disney (Mar. 27, 2025) (“March 2025 Letter”).

The Chairman’s letter identified a number of public reports and allegations that prompted concern. *See id.* at 2 & nn.3, 5-10. Collectively, those sources suggested that Disney

- “may have relied on race, gender, or other protected characteristics in making hiring and promotion decisions”;
- “made compensation decisions based on race, gender, or other protected characteristics”;
- “limited workplace opportunities to employees based on race, gender, or other protected characteristic[s]”;
- “and/or made other decisions based on impermissibly discriminatory considerations.”

Ex. 4, Letter to Hon. Yvette Clarke at 4. “Other reports described affinity groups and programs that appeared to segregate employees on the basis of race or identity characteristics.” *Id.*; see Ex. 5, March 2025 Letter at 3 & n.4.

The Enforcement Bureau issued its initial investigatory letter of inquiry to Disney on June 5, 2025. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 4. In mid-June, Disney’s counsel contacted staff in the Bureau to request additional time to respond, and to seek to narrow the scope of the investigatory requests. See Ex. 26, E-mails Concerning First Letter of Inquiry, at 11-12 (attached) (e-mail from Disney’s outside counsel on June 18, 2025, at 20:14 ET).² After engaging with Disney’s requests through the remainder of June and into early July, the Bureau informed Disney that, “[t]o expedite this process, and without waiving or prejudicing our ability to renew our demand” for a broader range of documents in the future, the Commission would extend various negotiated deadlines. *Id.* at 7-8 (email from FCC to Disney’s outside counsel on July 2, 2025, at 13:14 ET).

When Disney’s response to the initial letter of inquiry did not resolve the Commission’s concerns of possible discrimination, the Bureau issued a supplemental letter of inquiry in February 2026. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 4. After the Bureau extended Disney’s time to respond to that request, Disney responded on April 21, 2026. *Id.* That response, however, did not meet the agency’s expectations, and it raised “considerable concerns” for Commission staff. See Ex. 27, E-mail from Pamela Kane, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Suzanne Tetreault, Outside Counsel for Disney, at 2 (May 15, 2026, at 12:52 ET) (attached); Letter to Rep. Clarke at 3. The staff

² The Commission’s rules permit parties to submit materials to the agency with a request for confidential treatment. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.459. Exhibits 26 and 27 are redacted to protect information that Disney has asked the Commission to treat as confidential. Because the redacted material currently remains under seal before the agency, see *id.* § 0.459(d)(3), undersigned counsel is not authorized to make it public at this time.

memorialized these concerns in an eleven-page, single-spaced explanatory document, which it shared with Disney's counsel on May 15, 2026. *See* Attachment, Ex. 27, at 3-13.

III. The License Renewal Proceeding.

A week after Disney's deficient response to the Enforcement Bureau's supplemental letter of inquiry, on April 28, 2026, the Media Bureau issued its order "calling in Disney's ABC licenses for early renewal." Wilkinson Ex. 41 (Dkt. 2-4), *The Walt Disney Company*, DA 26-416, ¶ 3 (Media Bur. Apr. 28, 2026) ("Early Renewal Order"). As of that date, the Commission had conducted "more than a year of investigative activity" related to the reports and allegations of discrimination at Disney, including through the Enforcement Bureau's letters of inquiry. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 5. But despite "ongoing engagement" with Disney concerning those requests, *id.*, the Commission was not receiving information that staff required—including "documents on behalf of more than [the] Disney-owned broadcast stations," Ex. 27, at 3; *see id.* at 3-13, which the Commission required to inform its investigation into the activities of the licensees. The Media Bureau accordingly called the stations' licenses for early renewal, aiming to assist the agency's investigation of possible unlawful discrimination. Wilkinson Ex. 41, Early Renewal Order ¶ 2.

The stations filed their renewal applications on May 28, 2026, and the Media Bureau announced procedures governing their consideration the following day. *See* Wilkinson Ex. 45 (Dkt. 2-4), *FCC's Media Bureau Establishes Pleading Cycle and Ex Parte Procedures for the Early Renewal Applications of the Walt Disney Company's ABC Licenses*, DA 26-541 (May 29, 2026). Among other things, the Media Bureau established a docket in which the public could submit information relevant to the stations' applications, and it established a pleading cycle under which petitions to deny were due "no later than June 29, 2026," oppositions no later than July 29, and replies by August 5. *See id.*

The Commission received six pleadings styled as petitions to deny the applications in the renewal proceedings. *See* Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 106 n.84 (citing FCC Electronic Comment Filing System, MB Docket No. 26-131, <https://perma.cc/C36P-K9AN>). Those submissions, in turn, generated lengthy oppositions—including from Disney—and replies. *See, e.g.*, PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 20 n.26 (citing Opposition of The Walt Disney Co. et al. to Petitions to Deny Renewals of Licenses, MB Dkt. No. 26-131 (July 29, 2026), <https://perma.cc/SH7V-BNMZ>). There were hundreds of other substantive filings, both in support of and against renewal, from a wide variety of parties—individual citizens, members of Congress, trade associations, unions, local governments, and public interest organizations from across the political spectrum. *See generally* MB Dkt. No. 26-131. As Plaintiffs recognize, the Commission also received over 150,000 “express” comments, largely in support of renewal.³ Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 106. The New York Times and other media outlets have reported that the stations solicited these comments through commercials urging viewers to “tell the agency not to take away their ‘trusted local station’” and providing “a QR code that led viewers directly to the F.C.C. website.” Ex. 6, John Koblin, *ABC Formally Rebukes F.C.C. for Review of TV Licenses*, N.Y. TIMES, at 3 (July 30, 2026) (attached).

The Commission is now in the process of reviewing and analyzing this voluminous record. As the Chairman has emphasized, although the “allegations and reports” of discrimination at Disney companies are “concerning,” they “do not represent FCC conclusions or determinations”; the agency is “reserving judgment on the issues” while assessing the evidence. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 4; *see also* Ex. 1, Shepardson, at 3.

³ The FCC’s express-comment form allows members of the public to participate less formally in FCC proceedings by submitting “brief comments” directly into an online form. *See* Ex. 7, FCC, Submit an Express Comment (attached).

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Preliminary Injunctions under *Winter*.

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 22. To obtain it, the movant must show that (1) “he is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in his favor”; and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” *Id.* The latter two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). The Supreme Court has held that at least the second factor—irreparable harm—must be likely and “not just a possibility.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 21.

Before *Winter*, courts weighed these factors on a “sliding scale,” allowing “an unusually strong showing on one of the factors” to overcome a weaker showing on another. *Damus v. Nielsen*, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 326 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting *Davis v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp.*, 571 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). The D.C. Circuit has not had occasion to conclusively decide whether that sliding scale survives *Winter* and *Nken*. *Make the Road N.Y. v. Mullin*, 179 F.4th 16, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2026). The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that “[t]he default rule is that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a clear showing” as to each *Winter* element. *Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney*, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024); see also *Sherley v. Sebelius*, 644 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (*Winter* “suggest[s] if not hold[s]” that each of the factors “is an ‘independent, free-standing requirement’”); *Singh v. Carter*, 185 F. Supp. 3d 11, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2016) (sliding scale approach is “highly questionable,” and a plaintiff “bears the burden of persuasion on all four preliminary injunction factors”).

If a claim fails as a matter of law, on a point of jurisdiction or on the merits, a preliminary injunction is unwarranted. See, e.g., *Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack*, 808 F.3d 905, 913

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“inability to establish a substantial likelihood of standing requires denial of the motion for preliminary injunction”); *see also Mullin v. Doe*, 146 S. Ct. 2121, 2137 (Jun. 26, 2026). And if a court “concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint.” *Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

II. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1).

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. *See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). A court considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” *Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC*, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting *Thomas v. Principi*, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The standard for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), however, is “less forgiving” than under Rule 12(b)(6). *Huang v. Wheeler*, 215 F. Supp. 3d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2016). Specifically, given a court’s “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority,” “the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion.” *Id.* at 107 (alterations in original; quoting *Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft*, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001)). And when applying Rule 12(b)(1), courts “may consider material outside the pleadings,” including judicially noticeable agency materials. *See Kareem v. Haspel*, 986 F.3d 859, 866 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs have failed to establish any of the requirements for preliminary relief. First, they fail to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits. Because they challenge the constitutionality of how the Commission is exercising (or may, in the future, exercise) its lawful powers under the Communications Act—they do not contend that the FCC is “unconstitutional in

much of [its] work”—this is not the kind of “extraordinary” case in which a district court may exercise jurisdiction outside the “ordinary statutory review scheme” for FCC orders. *Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC*, 598 U.S. 175, 180 (2023). Nor have Plaintiffs established retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The remaining equitable factors favor permitting the Commission to pursue its investigation to conclusion. The Court should therefore deny Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and grant the Commission’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

I. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits.

Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits because this Court lacks jurisdiction over this dispute. Nor are Plaintiffs likely to prevail on the substance of their First Amendment claim.

A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because Congress Has Channeled Judicial Review of Commission Orders to the Courts of Appeals.

1. TRAC Forecloses Jurisdiction in District Court.

Several interlocking statutory provisions establish the process for judicial review of Commission orders. Statutory interpretation “begins . . . with the text of the statute.” *Chao v. Day*, 436 F.3d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2006). First, the Hobbs Act vests the “court of appeals” with “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of . . . all final orders of the [Commission] made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47.” 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). Section 402(a), then, defines the Commission orders subject to Hobbs Act review in the court of appeals: “any order of the Commission under this chapter (except those appealable under [47 U.S.C. § 402(b)])” 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). Section 402(b) of the Communications Act covers a specified list of orders concerning licenses. *See id.* § 402(b). For those orders (and certain ancillary orders), Section 402(b) provides for judicial review exclusively in the D.C. Circuit. *Id.* Under the plain reading of these provisions, therefore, “pre-enforcement” review of FCC orders—that is, judicial review before the order is applied against the challenger—

must be pressed in the federal courts of appeals. *See McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs. v. McKesson Corp.*, 606 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2025) (Hobbs Act); *see also Wagner v. FEC*, 717 F.3d 1007, 1012 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (Section 402(b) “confer[s] exclusive jurisdiction to review those actions on this court” (citing *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d 607, 615 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); *FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc.*, 466 U.S. 463, 468 (1984) (“Exclusive jurisdiction for review of final FCC orders . . . lies in the Court of Appeals.”)).

In reference to these provisions, the D.C. Circuit has held that, “where a statute commits review of agency action to the Court of Appeals, any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court’s future jurisdiction is subject to the exclusive review of the Court of Appeals.” *TRAC*, 750 F.2d at 78-79; *accord id.* at 75 & n.26. Thus, even where there is not yet a “final” reviewable agency order, if allowing a claim to proceed in district court would deprive the court of appeals of its future jurisdiction under a claims-channeling statute like the Hobbs Act or Section 402(b), a district court lacks federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. *See TRAC*, 750 F.2d at 75 & n.26, 77; *see also La Voz Radio de la Comunidad v. FCC*, 223 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying *TRAC* in a licensing case under Section 402(b)); *Alter v. FCC*, Civ. A. No. 24-0745 (AHA), 2025 WL 1454377, at *2 (D.D.C. May 21, 2025) (district courts lack jurisdiction “no matter which of the two routes to judicial review [of FCC orders] applies”).

As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the mere fact that a special statutory review scheme requires parties to await the conclusion of an agency’s proceeding before judicial review becomes available does not mean district courts may side-step Congress’s jurisdictional design. *See Axon*, 598 U.S. at 192. That is true even when a party claims that a “protracted adjudicatory proceeding” will involve “expense and disruption.” *Id.* (quoting *FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.*, 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980)). Specialized review schemes allow agencies “a heightened role in

matters [they] customarily handle[], and can apply distinctive knowledge to.” *Id.* at 186. And once an agency’s processes have run their course, exclusive review in the courts of appeals ensures “rapid, conclusive, and nationwide dispute resolution.” *Nat’l Ass’n of Broad. v. FCC*, 147 F.4th 978, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Specialized review schemes thus help avoid “delays and uncertainty that otherwise could ensue from multiple pre-enforcement suits filed across time in multiple district courts and from subsequent appeals in the courts of appeals.” *McLaughlin*, 606 U.S. at 153. And generally, “an agency’s subsidiary decisions merge into the final agency action, which is then subject to review.” *Mullin*, 146 S. Ct. at 2136 (plurality opinion).

Here, the Commission has not yet issued any reviewable order as to Disney, ABC, or the stations. To be sure, Plaintiffs fear that the Commission might issue one that “den[ies] renewal or even revoke[s] [their] licenses.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 16; *see id. also* at 28, 32, 38; Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 12, 114. But this only confirms that Plaintiffs are in the wrong tribunal. The statute is clear that action seeking to enjoin or otherwise block any such order is subject to exclusive review in the D.C. Circuit. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2), (5). In these circumstances, the Communications Act preserves the prospective jurisdiction of the court of appeals, and this Court lacks jurisdiction. *See TRAC*, 750 F.2d at 75. To accept any other conclusion “encourages forum shopping and encourages dissatisfied claimants to ‘jump the gun’ by going directly to the district court to develop their case instead of exhausting their administrative remedies before the agency.” *Doe v. DEA*, 484 F.3d 561, 570 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Moreover, it encourages duplicative and potentially conflicting review, and the delay and expense incidental thereto.” *Id.* (citation modified). The D.C. Circuit has closed that door. *TRAC*, 750 F.2d at 74-79.

Plaintiffs profess concern that “the Commission may intentionally prolong the adjudicative process, miring ABC in years of costly litigation, with the threat of adverse action ever present.”

Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 12; *see* PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 49. But special review schemes routinely and permissibly “require parties to wait before appealing,” and thus “‘the expense and disruption’ of ‘protracted adjudicatory proceedings’ . . . do not justify immediate review.” *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 192. And if agency action is unreasonably delayed, Plaintiffs are not without recourse. As *TRAC* provides, *see* 750 F.2d at 77-78, a party may pursue relief from any undue delay under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), by seeking a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition, *see In re Halkin*, 598 F.2d 176, 179 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (these writs are “counterparts”), *overruled on other grounds by Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart*, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984).

2. The Narrow Path Courts Have Allowed for Judicial Review Outside Claims-Channeling Statutes Does Not Apply.

“[O]rdinary statutory review” will “not preclude a district court from entertaining” certain “extraordinary claims”: those that encompass “fundamental, even existential” challenges that “an agency is wielding authority unconstitutionally in all or a broad swath of its work.” *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 180, 189. This narrow exception to ordinary claims channeling does not mean every claim of unconstitutional agency action is reviewable in district court. Numerous cases recognize, for example, that claims challenging “the manner in which [an] agency has exercised or . . . failed to exercise” its statutory authority—unlike claims challenging the constitutionality of the underlying federal statute—may not be reviewed in district court. *Time Warner Ent. Co. v. FCC*, 93 F.3d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); *see also Bland v. Blanche*, Civ. A. No. 25-3499 (APM), 2026 WL 1998552, at *5 (D.D.C. July 10, 2026) (recognizing this distinction, and applying *TRAC*, not *Axon*, to separation-of-powers and bias claims); *Bold Alliance v. FERC*, Civ. A. No. 17-1822 (RJL), 2018 WL 4681004, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018) (no exception to *TRAC* where “constitutional theories go to [agency’s] *practice* of adjudicating claims—not to its power to do so”).

At a “30,000-foot” level, the Court in *Axon* explained that whether district court review is available involves grouping a plaintiff’s claims into one of two categories. 598 U.S. at 188-89. Claims “of the type” that “Congress thought belonged within a statutory [review] scheme” involve challenges to an agency’s “specific substantive decision” or “the commonplace procedures agencies use to make such a decision.” *Id.* at 189. On the other hand, claims challenging “the core of [an agency’s] existence” or “structure” are immediately reviewable because such claims “protest the ‘here-and-now’ injury of subjection to an unconstitutionally structured decisionmaking process.” *Id.* at 189, 192. That sort of injury is inflicted “irrespective of [the proceeding’s] outcome, or of other decisions made within it.” *Id.* at 192.

Not so here. Plaintiffs’ claim rather fits into the first category, to which claims channeling applies. Plaintiffs do not contend that the Commission is unconstitutionally structured; challenge the legality of the agency’s existence; or deny that the Commission may lawfully investigate broadcasters and seek to ensure they serve the public interest and comply with the communications laws. Instead, Plaintiffs complain that the Commission is exercising its lawful authority to unlawfully retaliate against them for their constitutionally protected expression.

This case is thus unlike *Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board*, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), where “the complaint alleged that the Board’s ‘freedom from Presidential oversight’ rendered unconstitutional ‘all power and authority [that the Board] exercised,’” *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 189 (alteration in original; quoting *Free Enter. Fund*, 561 U.S. at 508). Rather, this case aligns with *Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich*, 510 U.S. 200 (1994), and *Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), which involved “‘threshold’ and other ‘questions’” that were “squarely within the [agencies’] expertise,” *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 187. To resolve Plaintiffs’ claim that the Commission used the early renewal process for an improper purpose, this Court necessarily

must understand details about broadcast licensing, the public interest obligations of broadcasters under the Communications Act, and the Commission's rules. More importantly, the Court would be required to delve deeply into the antidiscrimination investigation that was the impetus for the early license renewal process. Legal and factual questions of that kind implicate the Commission's expertise concerning the governing statutory and regulatory framework.

Likewise, a correct application of *Thunder Basin* confirms the propriety of adhering to Congress's decision in the Communications Act to vest exclusive authority to review licensing decisions in the D.C. Circuit. *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 189. Under *Thunder Basin*, the first question is, "[C]ould precluding district court jurisdiction 'foreclose all meaningful judicial review' of the claim?" *Id.* at 186 (quoting *Thunder Basin*, 510 U.S. at 212-13)). Second, is "the claim 'wholly collateral to [the] statute's review provisions'?" *Id.* (alteration in original; quoting *Thunder Basin*, 510 U.S. at 212). And third, "is the claim 'outside the agency's expertise'?" *Id.* (quoting *Thunder Basin*, 510 U.S. at 212). Each of those factors, correctly applied here, supports that Congress intended to channel Plaintiffs' claim to the courts of appeals, and in particular, to the D.C. Circuit.

First, precluding district court jurisdiction does not deprive Plaintiffs of any "meaningful avenue of relief." *Id.* at 188 (quoting *Free Enter. Fund*, 561 U.S. at 491); *cf. TRAC*, 750 F.2d at 78 ("where a denial of review in the District Court will truly foreclose all judicial review, district court review might be predicated on the general federal question jurisdiction statute"). If the Commission should ultimately deny the renewal applications or revoke the licenses—as Plaintiffs speculate—they can challenge any such order in the D.C. Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b). And if the Commission were to "drag out" the administrative proceedings to "exert[] pressure" on them unlawfully, PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 49, Plaintiffs could seek relief in the court of appeals from "unreasonable agency delay." *TRAC*, 750 F.2d at 79.

Plaintiffs would rather not await a final Commission order or participate in the ongoing license renewal proceedings. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 48-49. But Congress may “require parties to wait before appealing, even when doing so subjects them to ‘significant burdens.’” *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 192. Particularly when Plaintiffs have pursued licenses to do business in a closely regulated industry, “the expense and annoyance of litigation” is not a sufficient basis to justify interlocutory challenges to ongoing agency proceedings. *Standard Oil Co.*, 449 U.S. at 244 (quoting *Petroleum Expl., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n*, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938)); see also *Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. NRC*, 680 F.2d 810, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (effort and expense of “additional administrative proceedings” is “inherent in a system of judicial review that is limited to final orders” and “cannot justify reviewing agency action that is otherwise interlocutory”).

Second, Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim is not “wholly collateral” to the Communications Act’s judicial review provisions. *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 186. On the contrary, it calls into question the validity of the Commission’s justifications for calling the Disney ABC station licenses in for early renewal—justifications that Plaintiffs argue were “obviously pretextual.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 35; see also *id.* at 34-41. But resolving those contentions of pretext would require this Court to consider the basis and justification for the Commission’s investigation. Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim thus is not separate from “anything particular about how [the agency’s investigatory power] was wielded.” *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 193. Instead, it closely “relate[s] to the subject of the [investigatory] actions” and the legitimacy of the agency’s underlying concerns. *Id.*

Third, Plaintiffs contend that the Commission has no knowledge or expertise that could be brought to bear by allowing the agency to consider their First Amendment objections. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 50-51. But the First Amendment objections, again, are bound up with the validity of the Commission’s basis for investigating questions of unlawful discrimination and other possible

public interest violations. Plaintiffs’ constitutional objections are thus “intertwined with [and] embedded in matters on which the [Commission is] expert.” *Axon*, 598 U.S. at 195. And Plaintiffs cannot dispute that the court of appeals “can hear constitutional claims.” *Khalil v. President, United States*, 164 F.4th 259, 280 (3d Cir. 2026) (per curiam). In sum, there is no reason to conclude that Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim should escape the specific scheme that Congress established to channel judicial review of Commission orders to the courts of appeals.

Invoking a handful of recent, nonbinding decisions, Plaintiffs ask this Court to expand *Axon*’s scope to hold that congressionally provided special review schemes can never apply where a plaintiff alleges that an agency used its statutory authority to suppress the plaintiff’s protected speech. *See* PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 51 (citing *Endocrine Soc’y v. FTC*, 832 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2026), and *Media Matters for Am. v. FTC*, No. 25-5302, 2025 WL 2988966 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (per curiam)). Both are readily distinguishable.

First, both *Media Matters* and *Endocrine Society* concerned the application of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 *et seq.*, which does not channel judicial review to the courts of appeals. Instead, there was “no dispute” in either case that “the next step for review of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional claims [was] in district court.” *Endocrine Soc’y*, 832 F. Supp. 3d at 10 (quoting *Media Matters*, 2025 WL 2988966, at *5). Thus, the plaintiffs in those cases—unlike Plaintiffs here and in *Thunder Basin*—did “not seek to circumvent an administrative proceeding followed by judicial review in a court of appeals.” *Media Matters*, 2025 WL 2988966, at *5.

Notably, too, the plaintiffs in *Endocrine Society* and *Media Matters* had no path to judicial review unless the FTC elected to enforce the civil investigative demands at issue by suits in district court—“a step that might never happen.” *Media Matters*, 2025 WL 2988966, at *5; *see also* 832 F. Supp. 3d at 9-10. By contrast here, as explained above, *see supra* p. 16-17, Plaintiffs are

statutorily entitled to challenge any final order the Commission may issue against their licenses. And in the meantime, as explained, they have a path to judicial review under the All Writs Act if the agency's proceeding is unreasonably delayed.

In sum, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, which both prevents Plaintiffs from meeting their burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, *see Food & Water Watch*, 808 F.3d at 913, and requires dismissal of the case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

B. Plaintiffs' First Amendment Retaliation Claim Fails on the Merits.

Even if this Court finds that it has jurisdiction, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim.⁴ To establish such a claim requires a plaintiff to prove, first, that "he engaged in conduct protected under the First Amendment"; second, that "the defendant took some retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff's position from speaking again"; and third, "a causal link between the exercise of a constitutional right and the adverse action taken against him." *Aref v. Lynch*, 833 F.3d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The improper motive "must be a 'but-for' cause [of the government action], meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive." *Nieves v. Bartlett*, 587 U.S. 391, 399 (2019). Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy these elements.

For one, aspects of broadcaster speech have long been subject to regulation. While broadcasters make editorial decisions that may receive First Amendment protection, this does not convert their employment conduct into protected speech, nor does it insulate them from the Commission's regulation and oversight. *See Nat'l Ass'n of Broad.*, 147 F.4th at 1002 ("[T]he

⁴ The Commission does not move to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Such a motion would accept all well-pleaded facts as true. Here, the FCC disputes many factual allegations in the Complaint but does so relying in part on evidence outside the Complaint.

Supreme Court has recognized that—in conferring public benefits—the government has significant regulatory leeway to impose speech restrictions that might otherwise be forbidden as a direct regulation of private conduct.”); *see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC*, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (“No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license because ‘the public interest’ requires it ‘is not a denial of free speech.’” (quoting *Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States*, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943))).

In addition, the Disney ABC stations have corporate owners with immense financial and other resources.⁵ They are thus far better able than the plaintiffs in *Endocrine Society* and *Media Matters*—which were much smaller, nonprofit organizations—to assume the burdens of government investigation. *See Media Matters*, 2025 WL 2988966, at *1; *Endocrine Soc’y*, 832 F. Supp. 3d at 3. It is far from clear that a “person of ordinary firmness” in Plaintiffs’ “position” would be deterred from speaking based on the early renewal order or the possibility of a hearing designation order. *Aref*, 833 F.3d at 258. And to the extent Plaintiffs argue that Chairman Carr’s public statements are themselves “adverse actions” that give rise to an actionable retaliation claim, PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) 33-34, public officials are expected “to speak freely on questions of government policy”; free expression of that kind, unconnected with any administrative conduct, is not an adverse action. *See Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson*, 595 U.S. 468, 477-78 (2022).

Regardless, the most significant obstacle to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim is their failure to establish the required “causal link,” i.e., that “but for” the retaliatory animus alleged, the Commission would not have issued the early renewal order. Establishing this element is a

⁵ For the fiscal year ended September 27, 2025, Disney had \$94.425 billion in revenue. *See The Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K)*, at 36 (Nov. 13, 2025), *available at* https://s206.q4cdn.com/979796730/files/doc_financials/2025/ar/2025-Annual-Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2026).

“difficult task.” *Endocrine Soc’y*, 832 F. Supp. 3d at 15. Allegations (or even “proof”) “of some retaliatory animus in [an] official’s mind” are insufficient. *Hartman v. Moore*, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006). Moreover, the “longstanding presumption of regularity” that attaches to government action is at its peak in the context of law-enforcement investigations, which involve a “high order” of “executive discretion.” *Id.* at 263. If “retaliation was not the but-for cause of [an adverse action], the claim fails for lack of causal connection between unconstitutional motive and resulting harm.” *Id.* at 260. Plaintiffs here have not established the necessary “causal link.”

1. The Impetus for the Early Renewal Proceeding Was the Need for More Information to Support the Antidiscrimination Investigation.

Ensuring that broadcasters operate in the public interest—without engaging in “intentional employment discrimination” on the basis of race, sex, or other protected classes, *Beaumont Branch of the NAACP*, 854 F.2d at 506—is among the Commission’s core functions. 47 U.S.C. § 151. And the President has established combatting unlawful discrimination through policies purporting to promote “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (“DEI”) as a policy priority. *See, e.g.*, Exec. Order No. 14151, *Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing*, 90 Fed. Reg. 8339 (Jan. 20, 2025) (directing agencies to terminate DEI initiatives within government). Chairman Carr has signaled his commitment to that priority from the outset of his leadership of the Commission. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 8, Press Release, Office of Chairman Brendan Carr, FCC, *Agency Will Completely Carry Out Statutory Mission Without Discrimination* (Jan. 21, 2025).

Consistent with that priority, the Chairman informed Disney on March 27, 2025, that the Enforcement Bureau had opened an investigation into allegations of “invidious forms of DEI discrimination” at Disney companies. Ex. 5, March 2025 Letter at 2. He was transparent about the reasons for doing so: “[P]ublic reports” and “whistleblower documents” had called the agency’s attention to company standards that imposed “racial and identity quotas” for the selection

of “writers, directors, crew, and vendors” at ABC. *Id.* at 3. Evidence further suggested that ABC had “utilized race-based hiring databases and restricted fellowships to select demographic groups,” and that “executive bonuses may . . . have been tied to DEI ‘performance.’” *Id.*

Chairman Carr announced the investigation into these practices long before making any of the statements about *The View*, Jimmy Kimmel, or President Trump’s July 2026 public address on which Plaintiffs focus their narrative in this case. *See* PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 20-23, 25-26; *see also infra* p. 38-39 (discussing chronology).

The investigation began, as is typical, with letters of inquiry seeking documents and narrative responses from Disney. *See* Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 4. These letters sought information relevant to whether Disney’s regulated broadcast stations had engaged in unlawful discrimination, *id.*, including by seeking information about “enterprise-wide policies that impact its owned station group,” Ex. 27, at 3. Disney did not dispute the Commission’s authority to investigate discrimination at the broadcast stations; it sought instead to narrow the scope of the investigatory requests and obtain more time to respond. *See* Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 66. Staff in the Enforcement Bureau engaged with Disney on the company’s requests. *See* Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 5. And whereas the courts in both *Media Matters* and *Endocrine Society* found that the FTC’s civil investigative demands did not make the grounds for the agency’s investigations clear—a finding that weighed heavily in both cases—here, there is no dispute that the Enforcement Bureau’s letters of inquiry made the grounds for the Commission’s investigation clear. *See, e.g.,* Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 64-65 (referencing the Commission’s stated reasons for the investigation); *cf. Media Matters*, 2025 WL 2988966, at *7 (in considering whether the FTC’s reasons for its civil investigative demand were potentially pretextual, “the district court permissibly weighed the fact that the [FTC’s] sweeping demand was issued without the statutorily required explanation of the

permissible grounds for its issuance”); *Endocrine Soc’y*, 832 F. Supp. 3d at 18 (it was “unclear who the Commission hypothesize[d] [was] violating the FTC Act,” and the agency “offer[ed] no answers”).

Yet after more than a year of investigation, the Commission was still awaiting information it expected to receive. *See* Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke, at 5. Then, on April 21, 2026, Disney made a submission to the agency that the staff found woefully deficient. *See id.*; *see also* Ex. 27, at 3-13 (memorializing the deficiencies of Disney’s responses in the antidiscrimination investigation). The next week, the Media Bureau called for early renewal of the Disney ABC station licenses. Wilkinson Ex. 41 (Dkt. 2-4), Early Renewal Order ¶ 3.

The order explained that initiating the early renewal process would “allow[] the FCC to conduct its ongoing investigation and enable[] the FCC to ensure that the broadcaster[s] [have] been meeting [their] public interest obligations.” *Id.* ¶ 2. That is so because early renewal, unlike the enforcement investigation, is a public process that includes the possibility of an evidentiary hearing under 47 U.S.C. § 309. *See supra* p. 15. In other words, the Commission responded to what it perceived as a pattern of evasion in the antidiscrimination investigation by initiating a process in which it would have broader access to information in the investigation—just as the Commission’s rules contemplate. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 73.3539(c).

Throughout this time, as public officials do, Chairman Carr made public statements, gave interviews, and posted on social media about a range of issues relevant to the Commission’s work, including its focus on ensuring that broadcasters meet their statutory public interest obligations. Plaintiffs’ one-sided assembly of the Chairman’s statements seeks to portray him as targeting Disney. But they cite his statements out of context at every turn.

Perhaps most prominently, Plaintiffs state, incorrectly, that Chairman Carr claimed credit for “coercive” FCC regulatory efforts resulting in certain changes at media companies during March 2026 remarks. *See* Pl. Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 27; *id.* at 41 & n.68. But Chairman Carr did no such thing. He was not listing changes brought about by any form of coercive or even FCC action. He was describing changes in the media sector that have taken place over many years for many reasons—from legislation that Congress passed, to the President’s choice to take his message directly to the public, which disintermediated the media. *See* Wilkinson Ex. 38 (Dkt. 2-4), Ryan Mancini, *FCC’s Brendan Carr: Trump Is “Winning” Against “Fake News Media,”* The Hill, at 3 (Mar. 28, 2026) (President Trump “smashed the façade” of legacy media). The actions that media companies and Congress took in response had nothing to do with any action, or threatened action, by the FCC. *See id.* Nowhere in the cited statement did Chairman Carr “celebrate[]” that the Commission had supposedly extracted concessions from media companies for political purposes, which it had not. *Contra* Pl Mem. at 41.

Plaintiffs also misconstrue an interview during which Chairman Carr told a reporter: “If you didn’t take us seriously, now you should.” Pl Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 10. Plaintiffs urge the Court to interpret that statement to relate to remarks by Jimmy Kimmel and to President Trump’s statement that Kimmel should be fired. *See id.* at 9-10. But Chairman Carr made that statement not about Jimmy Kimmel, but about the Commission’s decision to use the early renewal proceeding in aid of the antidiscrimination investigation. *See* Wilkinson Ex. 44 (Dkt. 2-4), Anna Nicolaou, *‘The US Needed A Shock To The System’: Brendan Carr, Media Watchdog,* Financial Times, at 33 (May 15, 2026). And indeed, far from saying that as a threat in connection with Kimmel, Chairman Carr went on to tell the reporter: “We have to make decisions based on where

we are in the enforcement [and] investigative matter, and to some extent, ignore how that’s going to play in the court of public opinion.” *Id.* at 3.

In another example, Plaintiffs assert that “the Chairman has publicly declared his belief that the public interest standard should account for the ‘political ideology’ of a broadcaster’s programming.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 40. That is not what he said. In context, the quote sets forth Chairman Carr’s perspective that late-night hosts have gone “from being court jesters that would make fun of everybody in power to being court clerics and enforcing a very narrow political ideology.” Wilkinson Ex. 24 (Dkt. 2-3), Jasmine Baehr, *FCC Chair Brendan Carr Defends ABC Affiliates Pulling Jimmy Kimmel Show After Monologue About Charlie Kirk*, Fox News, at 156 (Sept. 17, 2025). And far from suggesting that the Commission “should get to dictate the content of network television,” PI Mem. at 12, Chairman Carr has unequivocally stated that “the FCC should not operate as a speech police,” *see* Ex. 9, FCC, *Press Conference Following Commission Open Meeting of April 30, 2026*, Rev at 17:14 (May 4, 2026) (attached); *accord id.* at 18:44.

More generally, the Chairman has consistently emphasized that the Commission intends to ensure all broadcasters—not just ABC—operate in the public interest, and he has participated in a robust public debate on what that entails. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 10, David Shepardson, *US FCC could speed up broadcast license reviews, says agency head Carr*, Reuters (Mar. 16, 2026) (attached); *see also* Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 5 (“[T]he FCC has not singled out any one company for special treatment.”); Ex. 2, May 28 Public Notice (reminding broadcasters of their public interest obligations). And he has repeatedly underscored that the “allegations and reports” of discrimination at Disney companies “do not represent FCC conclusions or determinations,” and that the agency is “reserving judgment on the issues” while assessing the evidence. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 4; *see also, e.g.*, Ex. 1, Shepardson, at 3 (FCC will “follow the facts and the law

wherever they take” the Disney investigation). In short, the Commission initiated the early renewal proceeding to serve its legitimate investigatory needs.

2. The Commission’s Investigatory Interests Are Not Pretextual.

Plaintiffs’ various attempts to portray the Commission’s investigatory interests as pretextual are unpersuasive. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 34-41.

Selective Chronology. To begin, Plaintiffs give short shrift to the history of the Commission’s investigation into reports and allegations of invidious discrimination at Disney. In the chronology they supply, for example, they conspicuously omit any reference to that investigation. *See generally* PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 53-63. The chronology fails to acknowledge (1) the Chairman’s letter disclosing the investigation to Disney in March 2025; (2) the Enforcement Bureau’s letter of inquiry dated June 5, 2025, and subsequent engagement with Disney on that request; (3) the follow-up letter of inquiry in February 2026, as to which Disney requested and received extra time to respond; (4) the deficient response that Disney supplied on April 21, 2026; and (5) the Commission’s subsequent correspondence detailing the deficiencies of Disney’s responses. *See supra* pp. 17-19; Ex. 27, at 3-13.

Those are meaningful omissions. The listed materials demonstrate that the Commission’s investigation of potentially discriminatory practices at Disney was well underway before Chairman Carr made any of the comments that Plaintiffs highlight about either *The View* (first made on July 24, 2025), late-night host Jimmy Kimmel (first made on September 17, 2025), or ABC’s carriage of President Trump’s July 2026 speech. *See* PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 57, 58, 63. Quite clearly, an FCC investigation begun in March 2025 could not have been in reaction to comments made months (or a year) later. Similarly, in asserting a connection between the early renewal order issued on April 28, 2026, and President Trump’s statements the day before, Plaintiffs ignore the fact that the

renewal order followed on the heels of their April 21 deficient response to the Enforcement Bureau's February 2026 supplemental letter of inquiry.

Depiction of the Investigation as Unprecedented. Where Plaintiffs do acknowledge the antidiscrimination investigation, they exaggerate its “volume and scope,” calling it “unheard-of in modern FCC practice.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 37. That characterization is unsupported. Disney is a large and complex corporation, and the challenged practices extended to each of its eight owned and operated broadcast stations. It is hardly surprising that, in pursuing their investigation, Commission staff would ask a comprehensive set of initial and follow-up questions to get a complete picture of Disney's complex structure and operations and the scope of its potentially discriminatory policies.

Plaintiffs also place undue weight on the relative rarity of early renewal proceedings. Indeed, they refer to the Commission's early renewal order as “unprecedented” at least ten times. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 9, 11, 24 & n.40, 31, 32, 35, 38. No one disputes—and Chairman Carr himself has acknowledged—that in recent decades, the Commission has not (except once) “used [the] tool” of calling for early renewal of broadcast licenses. *See* Wilkinson Ex. 44 (Dkt. 2-4), Nicolaou at 33. But the rule permitting calls for early renewal is longstanding. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 73.3539(c); *Reregulation of Radio and TV Broadcasting*, 72 F.C.C.2d 534, 535, 570 (1979) (codifying the current version of this rule). And already in March 2026, Chairman Carr discussed the possibility of reinvigorating the use of the rule with respect to broadcasters generally. *See* Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 5 & n.13 (citing Ex. 10, Shepardson). That was many weeks before President Trump's comments on April 27, 2026, that Plaintiffs say was the impetus for the early renewal order. *See* PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 24. And Plaintiffs' stations are not the only ones as to which the Commission has recently called for early renewal. *See* Ex. 11, *Bridge News, LLC*, DA

26-413 (Apr. 27, 2026). That the Commission is now availing itself of all lawful tools to support its investigation into the practices of the Disney ABC stations, as well as other broadcasters, demonstrates responsible enforcement vigor, not animus.

Allegation of Differential Treatment for “Disfavored” Broadcasters. Plaintiffs additionally contend that Chairman Carr was “‘chomping at the bit’ to target [them]” because, immediately upon assuming leadership of the Commission, he reinstated a complaint against Disney ABC station WPVI alleging that WPVI had engaged in “news distortion” during its carriage of the Presidential debate of September 10, 2024. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 37-38 (quoting *Media Matters for Am. v. FTC*, 805 F. Supp. 3d 105, 136 (D.D.C. 2025)). They contrast this action with the Media Bureau’s parallel inaction in a licensing proceeding for Fox station WTFX. *See id.* at 38 & n.65. According to Plaintiffs, that inaction reflects preferential treatment for a favored broadcaster (Fox) and, by extension, is evidence of the agency’s “retaliatory objective . . . targeting [Disney].” *Id.* Yet again, Plaintiffs omit important context that undermines their claim of “retaliatory intent.” *Id.* at 37.

The complaint against WPVI was one of three complaints filed against broadcasters during the 2024 election season that the FCC denied in the waning days of the Biden Administration, on January 16, 2025. *See* Ex. 12, Letter Order, *Preserving the First Amendment*, GN Docket No. 25-11 (Enforcement Bur. 2025) (WPVI Order, attached); Ex. 13, Letter Order, *News Distortion Complaint Involving CBS Broadcasting Inc., licensee of WCBS, New York, NY* (Enforcement Bur. 2025) (“WCBS Order,” attached); Ex. 14, *Equal Opportunities Complaint Involving NBC Telemundo License, LLC, licensee of WNBC, New York, NY et al*, DA 25-56 (Media Bur. 2025) (“NBC Order,” attached). Like the complaint against WPVI, the complaint against WCBS alleged news distortion (in connection with a *60 Minutes* interview of then-Vice President Harris). The

complaint against WNBC alleged a violation of the Commission’s “equal time” rule (after Vice President Harris appeared on Saturday Night Live).

In parallel, also on January 16, 2025, the Media Bureau granted renewal of the license of Fox station WTXF. *See* Ex. 15, *Preserving the First Amendment*, DA 25-57 (Media Bur. 2025) (“WTXF Order,” attached). In renewing that license, the Bureau denied a “petition to deny” that had been filed in the proceeding in July 2023. *See id.*; Ex. 16, *The Media and Democracy Project et al., Petition to Deny*, LMS File No. 0000213362 (filed July 3, 2023) (attached). The petition centered on allegations of news distortion, relying in large part on a state court’s finding that a cable network under common control with WTXF had disseminated false statements during the 2020 election. *See* WTXF Order ¶ 13. There was no evidence, however, that WTXF had ever aired any of the cable programming at issue. *See id.* ¶ 14. On that basis, and for other reasons explained in the order, the Media Bureau denied the petition. *See id.* ¶ 16.

On January 22, 2025, once Chairman Carr assumed the Commission’s leadership, the complaints against WCBS, WNBC, and WPVI were reinstated. *See* Ex. 17, *News Distortion Complaint Involving WPVI Television (Philadelphia), LLC*, DA 25-84 (Enforcement Bur. 2025) (“WPVI Reinstatement Order,” attached); Ex. 18, *News Distortion Complaint Involving CBS Broad. Inc.*, DA 25-85 (Enforcement Bur. 2025) (“WCBS Reinstatement Order,” attached); Ex. 19, *Equal Opportunities Complaint Involving NBC Telemundo License, LLC, licensee of WNBC, New York NY*, DA 25-83 (Media Bur. 2025) (“WNBC Reinstatement Order,” attached). The Media Bureau did not reinstate the petition to deny in the WTXF renewal proceeding or repeal the order granting WTXF’s application for renewal. *See* Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 62.

Without acknowledging this context, Plaintiffs characterize the reinstatement against WPVI, and inaction as to WTXF, as “evidence that similarly situated persons were treated

differently.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 38 n.65. But as the above discussion makes clear, there were both procedural and substantive differences between the WTFX proceeding and the others (including the NBC and CBS proceedings, which Plaintiffs ignore altogether). *See* Ex. 20, Letter from Chairman Brendan Carr, FCC, to Ranking Member Richard Blumenthal, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at 3-4 (Mar. 26, 2025) (“Letter to Sen. Blumenthal,” attached). The petition to deny against WTFX had been pending for more than a year and a half when the Media Bureau denied it. The Bureau had compiled a record on the petition, reviewed it, and explained why the petition did not warrant an evidentiary hearing. *See* Ex. 15, WTFX Order ¶¶ 4-6, 11-19. Among other reasons, the petition was denied because it centered on allegedly false statements by a cable network, not the broadcast licensee. *See id.* ¶ 14. The Commission does not license cable networks, and they do not have the same public interest obligations as broadcasters. *See* Ex. 20, Letter to Sen. Blumenthal at 4.

By contrast, the complaints against the ABC, CBS, and NBC stations were more recent and concerned material aired on the regulated broadcast stations—not on affiliated cable networks. When those complaints were dismissed in the last days of the Biden Administration, the Commission had not compiled a record concerning the allegations. The orders issued on January 22 thus reasonably recognized that the January 16 orders denying those complaints had been “issued prematurely based on an insufficient investigatory record for the station-specific conduct at issue.” *E.g.*, Ex. 17, WPVI Reinstatement Order ¶ 1. Reinstating those complaints so that the Commission could consider them in the ordinary course was “even-handed treatment,” Ex. 20, Letter to Sen. Blumenthal at 4, not evidence of retaliatory animus.

Utility of the Renewal Proceeding. Plaintiffs also seek to show pretext by arguing that the Commission “does not explain why [the early renewal proceeding] is essential to . . . the

[antidiscrimination] investigation.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 39. But as the complaint reflects, the Enforcement Bureau repeatedly engaged with Disney concerning the inadequacy of its responses. *See* Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 67 (referencing “the Bureau’s continued insistence on document productions and narrative responses covering entities operating wholly separate from the Stations”); Ex. 26 at 2-5; Ex. 27 at 3-13. Disney disagrees that the information the agency sought was relevant, but targets of agency investigations routinely seek to narrow the scope of investigatory requests. What was unusual here is that Disney “unilaterally limited” its responses to the letters of inquiry. Ex. 27 at 3.

After Disney failed to fully respond to two written information requests, the Media Bureau called for early renewal of the station licenses. *See* Wilkinson Ex. 41 (Dkt. 2-4), Early Renewal Order ¶ 1. That step furthered the investigation in two significant respects. First, an early renewal proceeding, unlike an enforcement investigation, allows for public input. *See supra* p. 15. That process has already generated numerous comments supporting licenses renewal, but also two petitions to deny that specifically address allegedly discriminatory practices at Disney. *See* Ex. 21, Petition to Deny of the Center for American Rights, MB Dkt. 26-131, at 42-51 (June 30, 2026) (highlighting “specific programs that demonstrate race and gender-based discrimination”) (attached); Ex. 22, Petition to Deny Renewal Licenses of America First Legal, MB Dkt. 26-131 at 8-15 (June 30, 2026) (describing Disney’s “Inclusion Standards” and asking the FCC to “remedy [ABC’s] discriminatory employment practices”) (attached). The Commission is determining whether the submissions are sufficient to address the agency’s antidiscrimination and broader public interest concerns. If more information is needed, however, a public evidentiary hearing in which the Commission would have broader access to information will now be available as a backstop—the second benefit of calling for early renewal. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(3). Given

Disney's unwillingness to provide complete responses to the Enforcement Bureau's investigative requests and the availability, in the license renewal context, of public input and an evidentiary hearing, the Media Bureau reasonably concluded that calling for early renewal of the Disney ABC station licenses was "essential within the meaning of agency regulations" to the antidiscrimination investigation. Wilkinson Ex. 41, Early Renewal Order ¶ 3.

Chairman Carr's Public Statements. Finally, Chairman Carr has not suggested that either the antidiscrimination investigation or the early renewal proceeding is "a direct response to ABC's speech." PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 35. Instead, he has observed that the Commission went "through rounds and rounds of discovery" with Disney, that "[t]heir responses were deficient," and that "the timing of [early renewal] was based on where [the agency was] in the discovery process." Wilkinson Ex. 53 (Dkt. 2-4), Alisa Vasquez, *Full Transcript: Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission Brendan Carr*, Politico, at 115-16 (July 31, 2026).

The Chairman has also repeatedly emphasized that the agency "has not singled out any one company for special treatment." Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 5; *see also* Ex. 23, News Release, CNBC, *First on CNBC: Transcript: FCC Chairman Brendan Carr Speaks with CNBC's "Squawk on the Street" Today*, at 5 (July 10, 2026) ("July 10 Eisen Interview," attached) (agency will "be guided based on the record," "whether it's for Disney or others"). And while he has not denied that the allegations of invidious discrimination at Disney are serious and concerning, he has consistently stressed that the Commission has not yet reached any determinations and will "follow the facts and the law wherever it goes." Ex. 24, News Release, CNBC, *First on CNBC: Transcript: FCC Chairman Brendan Carr Speaks with CNBC's "Squawk on the Street" Today*, at 4 (May 29, 2026) ("May 29 Eisen Interview," attached); *see also* Ex. 23, July 10 Eisen Interview, at 5 ("But

ultimately, we have not made our decision yet. But we'll be guided based on the record before us.”).⁶

The mere fact that an agency official may “speak vigorously, sometimes colorfully” in the public sphere to “spark debate” does not imply prejudgment of a licensing proceeding. *Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. NRC*, 509 F.3d 562, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Political discourse by prominent public figures,” even when “couched in terms” that members of the public find “scandaliz[ing],” does not establish animus. *Mullin*, 146 S. Ct. at 2139.⁷

Because Plaintiffs do not establish the necessary “causal link between [their] protected speech and the early renewal proceedings,” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 34, they have failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim.

II. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Irreparable Harm.

The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable injury.” *Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England*, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The moving party must demonstrate an injury that is “‘both certain and great’” and “of such *imminence* that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” *Id.* (emphasis in original; quoting *Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC*, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The injury must be beyond remediation; the

⁶ See also Wilkinson Ex. 15 (Dkt. 2-3), David Folkenflik, *Trump taps FCC’s Brendan Carr to lead the agency*, NPR, at 114 (Nov. 17, 2024) (“we’ll see what [broadcasters] have to say”); Wilkinson Ex. 44 (Dkt. 2-4), Nicolaou at 34 (“We have to make the decisions based on where we are in the enforcement and investigative matter, and to some extent, ignore how that is going to play out in the court of public opinion.”).

⁷ Plaintiffs’ attempt to establish animus by pointing to the President’s statements is even less persuasive. See *Trump v. United States*, 603 U.S. 593, 629 (2024) (“As the sole person charged by the Constitution with executing the laws of the United States, the President oversees—and thus will frequently speak publicly about—a vast array of activities that touch on nearly every aspect of American life. Indeed, a long-recognized aspect of Presidential power is using the office’s ‘bully pulpit’ to persuade Americans, including by speaking forcefully or critically, in ways that the President believes would advance the public interest.”).

“possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” *Clevinger v. Advoc. Holdings, Inc.*, 134 F.4th 1230, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

First, Plaintiffs claim to have established irreparable harm simply by alleging that they “are ‘suffering from a campaign of retaliation against them in response to their exercise of their First Amendment Rights.’” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 42 (quoting *Media Matters for Am. v. Paxton*, 138 F.4th 563, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2025)). But as explained above (Argument II.B), Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of that claim. A meritless constitutional claim does not meet the D.C. Circuit’s “high standard for irreparable injury.” *Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches*, 454 F.3d at 297; *cf. Hanson v. Dist. of Columbia*, 120 F.4th 223, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (“Even in the sensitive areas of freedom of speech and religion, where the risk of chilling protected conduct is especially high, [courts] do not ‘axiomatically’ find that a plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm simply because it alleges a violation of its rights.”).

Plaintiffs alternatively contend that they have shown irreparable harm from “ongoing adverse effects to [their] First Amendment rights.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 42 (quoting *Paxton*, 138 F.4th at 585). This theory fails, too. In *Paxton*, the D.C. Circuit found “significant evidence of ongoing adverse effects” to the plaintiff media company’s “First Amendment Rights,” 138 F.4th at 585. The evidence allowed the court to find “present, concrete, and objective harms (not merely ‘chilling effects’) resulting from retaliatory government actions that [had] adversely affected [the plaintiff’s] newsgathering activities and media business operations.” *Id.* at 579. In particular, the plaintiff’s chief operating officer declared that “staff [were] unwilling to speak internally on topics related to the investigation; outside groups [had] limited their collaboration with Media Matters; and Media Matters [had] paused similar reporting for at least one other media platform.” *Id.* A

reporter stated that “his editors declined to publish two of his articles; he declined to pitch ideas for related reporting; and he left out relevant details in some articles being published.” *Id.* And the editor-in-chief declared that “Media Matters [had] changed its review process; pared back its reporting; and declined to pursue follow-up on the challenged article.” *Id.* By contrast here, Plaintiffs’ evidence of “concrete impacts to their programming” does not approach that showing. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 43. They primarily rely on the declaration of Eric Lieberman, in-house counsel for Disney, for this purpose. *See* PI Mot. Ex 5, Lieberman Decl. (Dkt. 2-5) ¶¶ 23-38. And that declaration does not establish irreparable harm.

Mr. Lieberman first points to ABC’s decision to carry the President’s July 16, 2026, primetime address on its nonbroadcast streaming service (purportedly against its better judgment), and he recites public criticism from the President and the Chairman concerning ABC’s decision not to broadcast the speech over the air. Lieberman Decl. (Dkt. 2-5) ¶¶ 23-26. He hypothesizes that ABC will experience additional pressure from the “approaching midterm elections.” *Id.* ¶ 28. The Court should not credit these claims. Contrary to Mr. Lieberman’s assertion that ABC “ordinarily would not have” streamed President Trump’s speech, *id.* ¶ 23, ABC took the same approach in 2022, when ABC News LIVE apparently streamed a Presidential address (President Biden’s) that it declined to air on broadcast television. *See* ABC News Prime, *Biden’s primetime speech; Trump special master showdown; Ukraine plant in crossfire* (ABC News LIVE, streamed Sept. 1, 2022, at 20:01:38 ET), available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/c2IZg5mOKCU> (last visited Sept. 3, 2026). And more fundamentally, the claim that ABC “decided to livestream the speech” out of concern that the Commission would retaliate against it makes little sense when, as Mr. Lieberman acknowledges, the Chairman had expressed the view that “broadcasters should be carrying” the speech—i.e., airing it on broadcast television. Lieberman Decl. ¶¶ 23, 26.

Livestreaming was not responsive to the Chairman’s statement. In that sense, the “livestreaming” episode, if anything, shows that Plaintiffs have *not* adapted their behavior to supposed “pressure” from the Commission. Lieberman Decl. ¶ 28.

Mr. Lieberman next discusses the talk show *The View*, and the Commission’s review of that program’s exemption from the “equal opportunities” rule. Lieberman Decl. (Dkt. 2-5) ¶¶ 29-30. But, again, he does not say that ABC has changed its editorial process as a result of that review. *Id.* He asserts that “losing [the] exemption” might, in the future, require ABC to decide “*against* interviewing a candidate it deems newsworthy and otherwise *would* have aired.” *Id.* ¶ 30. That is a speculative future harm that, in any event, could be redressed on judicial review of any future decision depriving *The View* of the exemption. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); *see also Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n*, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (*per curiam*) (“The possibility that adequate . . . corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”).

While Mr. Lieberman does assert that “the process for evaluating potential guests for *The View* has changed,” Lieberman Decl. (Dkt. 2-5) ¶ 32, he insists at the same time that there has been no “change in the program’s editorial standards regarding the newsworthiness of any candidate who might otherwise have been invited during this period,” *id.* ¶ 33. Entirely missing from his declaration—or anything else Plaintiffs have proffered—is evidence that the Commission’s actions in any way have impeded Plaintiffs’ newsgathering, their collaboration with third parties, or reporters’ willingness to pitch reporting ideas. *Paxton*, 138 F.4th at 581. At most, Mr. Lieberman states that *The View* has been more cautious about which political candidates to invite on the program, and that it has “pass[ed] on further consideration of booking several political candidates.” Lieberman Decl. (Dkt. 2-5) ¶ 33.

Second, even if the Court credits Mr. Lieberman’s declaration and treats increased “circumspect[ion] in booking political candidates” for *The View* as a First Amendment injury, PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 22, that theory of irreparable harm has two additional, fatal shortcomings. First, Plaintiffs attempt to tie this alleged injury to “the early license renewal process,” and the “cumulative pressures” that process creates. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 22; *see also id.* at 16 (Commission has “raised the stakes yet again by directing the Stations to apply for license renewals years ahead of schedule”); *id.* at 32 (“These licenses generate substantial advertising and retransmission-consent revenue, all of which would be lost if the Commission decides not to renew (or even to revoke) the licenses.”). But as already explained, the Communications Act allows licensees to continue operating under their existing licenses for the duration of a renewal proceeding, including any evidentiary hearing or “judicial hearing” that Plaintiffs may pursue if they receive an adverse decision. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(3). For that reason, Plaintiffs cannot credibly link circumspection at *The View* to the early renewal proceeding—taken alone or cumulatively.

There is also a mismatch between Plaintiffs’ asserted injuries and the relief they seek. Enjoining the “early renewal proceedings” and prohibiting the FCC from taking “any actions . . . to coerce or threaten Plaintiffs with sanctions”—the remedies Plaintiffs seek in their motion, *see* PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) 51; Proposed Order (Dkt. 2-8)—would not stop the antidiscrimination investigation or the Commission’s review of *The View*’s equal time exemption. Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge the Commission’s authority to continue those proceedings or request that they be enjoined. Indeed, they insist that Disney has cooperated with the antidiscrimination investigation. *See* PI Mem. at 19-20. That cooperation belies Plaintiffs’ claimed injury.

Meanwhile, Jimmy Kimmel and *The View* remain on the air and Plaintiffs, not the Commission, retain full editorial control over their programing. For example, it was Disney that

“made the decision to suspend production on [*Jimmy Kimmel Live*] to avoid further inflaming a tense situation at an emotional moment for our country.” Ex. 25, GMA Team, *Jimmy Kimmel to return to air on Tuesday*, ABC News, at 3 (Sept. 22, 2025 1:01 p.m.) (attached). According to Disney, it made that decision because it “felt some of [Jimmy Kimmel’s] comments were ill-timed and thus insensitive.” *Id.* Likewise, it was Disney that decided to put the show back on the air after “thoughtful conversations with Jimmy.” *Id.* In these circumstances, Plaintiffs do not satisfactorily explain why preliminary relief is needed “before [the C]ourt can issue final judgment.” *AFL-CIO v. Sonderling*, Civ. A. No. 26-2061 (JEB), 2026 WL 1906727, at *6 (D.D.C. July 2, 2026).

Third, Plaintiffs argue that they are suffering economic damages, in the form of “time, money, and resources responding to [the Commission’s] pretextual investigative demands and preparing the license renewal applications.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 44. “Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.” *Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannerkraft Clothing Co.*, 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). Even if it did, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to make the requisite showing that either their participation in the renewal process or the possible outcome will “forc[e] [them] to shutter . . . operations immediately.” *Alpine Secs. Corp. v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth.*, 121 F.4th 1314, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2024); *see also Clevinger*, 134 F.4th at 1235 (“financial injury” must be “so great as to threaten its continued existence”); *Wisc. Gas Co.*, 758 F.2d at 674 (holding that economic harm qualifies as irreparable harm only when the alleged injury “threatens the very existence of the movant’s business”); *AFL-CIO*, 2026 WL 1906727, at *5 (rejecting conclusory assertion of “significant costs” as not supported by evidence).

Plaintiffs nonetheless insist that their unquantified economic injuries are irreparable on account of the government’s sovereign immunity against damages in First Amendment cases. PI

Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 45. The D.C. Circuit has never recognized such an exception to *Wisconsin Gas*, and this Court should not accept Plaintiffs’ invitation to do so. The cases in which courts have considered economic loss unrecoverable on account of the government’s sovereign immunity have required a showing of “significant” economic loss. *See, e.g., AFL-CIO*, 2026 WL 1906727, at *5; *Xiaomi Corp. v. Dep’t of Def.*, Civ. A. No. 21-0280 (RC), 2021 WL 950144, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021). “[E]ven in this situation, damages do not become *per se* irreparable” because to “hold otherwise would essentially eviscerate the irreparable harm requirement for any cases brought against the government: ‘[a]ny movant that could show any damages against an agency with sovereign immunity—even as little as \$ 1—would satisfy the standard.’” *Xiaomi Corp.*, 2021 WL 950144, at *10 (quoting *Air Trans. Ass’n of Am. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S.*, 840 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335 (D.D.C. 2012)).

True, one judge in this district once “characterized economic damages that are unrecoverable due to sovereign immunity as ‘irreparable *per se*.’” *ConverDyn v. Moniz*, 68 F. Supp. 3d 34, 49 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting *Feinerman v. Bernardi*, 558 F. Supp. 2d 36, 51 (D.D.C. 2008)). But that judge later recognized that *Feinerman* “goes too far[,] and the inability to recover economic losses can more accurately be considered as a factor in determining whether the movant has shown irreparable harm.” *Id.* (citing *Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson*, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 2011)). “Otherwise, a litigant seeking injunctive relief against the government would always satisfy the irreparable injury prong, nullifying that requirement in such cases.” *Id.*

Plaintiffs’ own cited authority, *Jenner & Block LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.*, 784 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2025), confirms this. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 45. There, the court found that, to warrant injunctive relief, any economic loss must be “significant.” *Jenner & Block*, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 114. The alleged harm was “Jenner’s ability to attract and retain clients and personnel,” which

allegedly put “a large amount of income” at risk. *Id.* By contrast, Plaintiffs here offer only conclusory statements on economic loss, without providing any specifics sufficient to establish irreparable harm. *See Nat’l Mining Ass’n*, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 52. And where this Court considered the government’s sovereign immunity as a factor in *Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of Pres.*, 789 F. Supp. 3d 15 (D.D.C. 2025) (AliKhan, J.), it did so in the context of evidence of “significant financial loss” to the business of a law firm subject to an executive order that potentially threatened “a third” of the firm’s matters, *id.* at 56. Plaintiffs thus have not carried their “considerable burden” of establishing irreparable economic harm. *Nat’l Mining Ass’n*, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 50.

Fourth, Plaintiffs assert unspecified reputational harm. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 45. They cite a single, conclusory paragraph in the Lieberman declaration, which in its entirety reads:

The ongoing attacks directed at ABC for its speech, false accusations that ABC has failed to comply with investigations, and existential threat to the Stations in the impending early license renewal process have tarnished, and continue to tarnish, the reputation that Plaintiffs have cultivated over numerous decades.

Lieberman Decl. (Dkt. 2-5) ¶ 35. “That conclusory assertion is not backed up” and does not prove that “the loss would be great.” *AFL-CIO*, 2026 WL 1906727, at *5. Plaintiffs’ unsupported claim is impossible to square not only with their assertion that public comments in the renewal proceeding “are overwhelmingly supportive of the Stations,” Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 106, but also, more fundamentally, with their attempt, in seeking preliminary relief, to short-circuit an administrative process through which they could make their case to the public and remove any “tarnish[]” from their reputation, PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 45; *see also* 47 U.S.C. § 309(e).

Finally, Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing suit and seeking injunctive relief serves to underscore their lack of irreparable harm. *See Fund for Animals v. Frizzell*, 530 F.2d 982, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (finding that a 44-day delay in seeking injunctive relief was inexcusable and bolstered the finding of no irreparable harm); *see also Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala*, 81 F. Supp.

2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) (delay in bringing action “mitigates against a finding of irreparable harm”); *Biovail Corp. v. FDA*, 448 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The delay in filing this suit further undermines any showing of irreparable injury”); *Cruz v. DHS*, Civ. A. No. 19-2727 (DLF), 2019 WL 8139805, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2019) (same).

Plaintiffs’ delay in filing the case is not “on its own” a sufficient reason to deny the preliminary injunction motion. *Gordon v. Holder*, 632 F.3d 722, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Still, Plaintiffs knew the Commission was investigating Disney for antidiscrimination violations as early as March 27, 2025, *see* PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 19, and only initiated this case on August 18, 2026—509 days later, *see generally* Compl. (Dkt. 1). They do not explain that delay. Even if the Court counts from the date on which the Commission ordered the Disney ABC stations to submit renewal applications, that occurred on April 28, 2026—112 days before Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit. Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 98. Considering the army of lawyers representing Plaintiffs in this case, this leisurely approach does not signal an emergency.

III. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Favor Denying Injunctive Relief.

Finally, granting a preliminary injunction would be contrary to the public interest. The balance of harms and the public interest elements of the injunctive relief test merge when the government is the opposing party, *Nken*, 556 U.S. at 435, and courts must “pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction,” *Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1982). Courts “explore the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large.” *Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan*, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991).

Here, the Commission has initiated a review to determine whether renewing Plaintiffs’ broadcast licenses is in the public interest. Congress has vested the Commission with the authority to make that determination and has prescribed the procedures for administrative and judicial

review. And the Commission's review appropriately includes considerations of whether the stations comply with the Commission's antidiscrimination requirements and other Commission rules. Granting Plaintiffs' requested relief—suspension of the administrative proceedings—effectively insulates their broadcast stations from the regulatory requirements and processes that Congress has prescribed. A court “cannot ‘ignore the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation.’” *United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.*, 532 U.S. 483, 497 (2001) (quoting *Virginian R. Co. v. Ry. Emps.*, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937)).

Plaintiffs do not require an injunction to continue using their broadcast licenses, *see* 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(3), and will be able to seek review in the D.C. Circuit of any adverse final licensing order, *id.* § 402(b). Meanwhile, they can continue to press their constitutional objections in the renewal proceeding, where the Communications Act ensures their ability to develop the administrative record. *See id.* § 309(e), (k)(3). Plaintiffs do not need relief from this Court to obtain meaningful judicial review. *See Khalil*, 164 F.4th at 280. And particularly because the injunction Plaintiffs seek would alter—not preserve—the status quo, the Court should allow the renewal proceeding to conclude. *See Hanson*, 120 F.4th at 248 (“first, do no harm”).

IV. The Court Should Require Plaintiffs to Post Security.

For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' motion in its entirety. But should the Court issue any injunctive relief, it should order Plaintiffs to post security. The Court may issue a preliminary injunction “only if the movant gives security” for “costs and damages sustained” by the Government if they are later found to “have been wrongfully enjoined.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Plaintiffs should be required to post an appropriate bond commensurate with the scope of any injunction. *See DSE, Inc. v. United States*, 169 F.3d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion to dismiss, deny Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief (Dkt. 2), and dismiss this case.

Dated: September 3, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICAN BROADCASTING
COMPANIES, INC. *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 26-2902 (LLA)

[PROPOSED] ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of Defendants' combined motion to dismiss and opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief, Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief (Dkt. 2), and the entire record herein, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief is DENIED as moot, and it is further

Ordered that this case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED:

Date

LOREN L. ALIKHAN
United States District Judge



EXHIBIT B

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PUBLISHEDUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 26-1785

SHERROD BROWN; JON OSSOFF; ROY A. COOPER, III; KRISTEN
MCDONALD RIVET,

Petitioners,

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION; UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,

Respondents,

and

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE; NATIONAL
REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE,

Intervenors.

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER,

Amicus Supporting Petitioners,

and

NATIONAL MEDIA RESEARCH, PLANNING & PLACEMENT; SMART
MEDIA GROUP; AND FLEXPOINT MEDIA,

Amicus Supporting Respondents.

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Federal Communications Commission.
(DA 26-300)

Argued: August 7, 2026

Decided: August 25, 2026

Before WILKINSON, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review granted by published opinion. Judge King wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Wynn joined. Judge Wynn wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: David Robert Fox, ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Scott M. Noveck, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. Thomas Ryan McCarthy, CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Intervenors. **ON BRIEF:** Richard A. Medina, Nicole E. Wittstein, ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Sharon Swingle, Jennifer Utrecht, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; D. Adam Candeub, General Counsel, Jacob M. Lewis, Deputy General Counsel, Sarah E. Citrin, Deputy Associate General Counsel, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. David L. Rosenthal, Conor D. Woodfin, CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Intervenors. Tara Malloy, Erin Chlopak, Saurav Ghosh, Shanna Ports, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Campaign Legal Center. Erin Morrow Hawley, John S. Ehrett, LEX POLITICA PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amici National Media Research, Planning & Placement; Smart Media Group; and Flexpoint Media.

KING, Circuit Judge:

This time-sensitive matter concerns who is entitled to particularly favorable rates — known as the “lowest unit charge,” or “LUC” — for broadcast campaign advertisements in the run-up to elections. The statutory LUC requirement provides that during the 45-day period preceding a primary election and the 60-day period preceding a general election, “[t]he charges made for the use of any broadcasting station by any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office in connection with his campaign” must be at “the lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount of time for the same period.” *See* 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A).

There is no question that candidates are entitled to the LUC. But it is disputed whether political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members can also be entitled to the LUC. The Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC,” or the “Commission”) has asserted that they can, saying so in a “Public Notice” issued by the FCC’s Media Bureau on March 30, 2026.

The Petition for Review before us challenges the Public Notice, which takes effect on September 4, 2026, for the impending November general election. The four petitioners, all Democrats, are U.S. House of Representatives candidate Kristen McDonald Rivet of Michigan and U.S. Senate candidates Sherrod Brown of Ohio, Jon Ossoff of Georgia, and Roy Cooper of North Carolina (collectively, the “Federal Candidates”). Their contention is that the Public Notice contravenes the plain language of the LUC requirement and pertinent campaign finance statutes. In the Federal Candidates’ words, the Public Notice “unlawfully dilutes [their] and other candidates’ statutory right to buy advertising time at

lowest unit charge by insisting that broadcasters make that same right available to political parties and joint fundraising committees in circumstances where their spending cannot, under campaign finance law, be considered spending by or on behalf of a candidate.” *See* Reply Br. of Pet’rs 1.

On the other side of this dispute are the FCC, as a respondent, and the National Republican Congressional Committee and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (together, the “Party Committees”), as intervenors. The FCC and the Party Committees separately — but similarly — argue both that we lack jurisdiction to review the Public Notice and that the Public Notice is correct on the merits.¹

As explained herein, we are confident of our jurisdiction to review the Public Notice. Further, we conclude that the LUC requirement and campaign finance statutes are clear that neither political parties nor joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members can be entitled to the LUC. We therefore grant the Petition for Review, such that we set aside and hold for naught the Public Notice.

I.

As background, the FCC’s Media Bureau was acting pursuant to its delegated authority² when, on March 30, 2026, it issued the Public Notice, titled “FCC Media Bureau

¹ We note that the United States is also a respondent, shares counsel with the FCC, and joins in the FCC’s arguments opposing the Petition for Review.

² In March 2002, the FCC established the Media Bureau by reorganizing the existing Cable Services and Mass Media Bureaus into a new entity. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 0.61. In doing (Continued)

Provides Guidance on Entitlement to Lowest Unit Charge for Legally Qualified Candidates for Federal Office and All Authorized Committees.” *See* J.A. 1.³ At its outset, the Public Notice specifies that the LUC requirement applies to the following:

- (1) “authorized committees, including authorized committees that engage in joint fundraising with legally qualified candidates for federal office”; and
- (2) “advertisements that qualify as coordinated expenditures of political parties and legally qualified candidates for federal office.”

Id. The Public Notice poses as a “remind[er]” of the LUC requirement and purports to merely “restate previous Media Bureau guidance regarding LUC eligibility.” *Id.* at 1-2. Significantly, however, the Public Notice identifies no previous Media Bureau guidance stating that political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members can ever be entitled to the LUC.

A.

On April 29, 2026, before filing their Petition for Review in this Court, the Federal Candidates filed an Application for Review with the FCC (the “Application for FCC Review,” or the “Application”).⁴ Seeking to have the full Commission set aside the Media

so, the FCC expressly delegated to the Media Bureau the authority to “[a]dminister and enforce rules and policies regarding political programming and related matters.” *Id.* § 0.61(e); *see also* 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(1) (authorizing FCC to delegate authority).

³ Citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this matter, which is wholly comprised of the two-page Public Notice.

⁴ The Application for FCC Review is an exhibit to the Federal Candidates’ Petition for Review in this Court. *See Brown v. FCC*, No. 26-1785, Ex. B (4th Cir. June 22, 2026), ECF No. 3.

Bureau's Public Notice, the Application contests the Public Notice's claim that it merely reiterates well-settled principles. The Application argues that the Public Notice instead constitutes a novel interpretation of the LUC requirement that is incompatible with the relevant statutes and directly contradicted by FCC and other precedents.

The Application also addresses how the Public Notice aggrieves the Federal Candidates, explaining that they are in "highly competitive" races for U.S. House and Senate seats being targeted by the Party Committees; that the Party Committees are expected to heavily spend on advertisements opposing the Federal Candidates and supporting their opponents, "including through coordinated expenditures and [joint fundraising committee] advertising"; and that by requiring broadcasters to extend the LUC to political parties and joint fundraising committees for such advertisements, the Public Notice "places [the Federal Candidates] at a competitive disadvantage, forcing them to respond to a higher volume of the counter advertisements than otherwise could have been purchased at the same price point, and diluting their independent campaign messaging." *See* Application for FCC Review 18-19.

Twice, the Application urges an expedited decision by the Commission given the impending November general election. In its introduction, the Application emphasizes that "[e]xpedited action by the Commission is essential." *See* Application for FCC Review at iv. And in closing, the Application reiterates that "urgent action by the Commission is needed" and that "[t]he Commission should therefore expedite this matter and promptly set aside the [Public Notice]." *Id.* at 19.

Nevertheless, in the months that followed, the Commission took no action whatsoever on the Application for FCC Review.

B.

Given the looming November general election, the Federal Candidates turned to this Court in late June 2026, filing their Petition for Review and successfully moving to expedite our proceedings. The FCC promptly responded with a still-pending motion to dismiss the Petition for Review for lack of jurisdiction, principally contending that there can be no judicial review of the Public Notice until the Commission issues a decision on the Application for FCC Review. The FCC's subsequent response brief repeats that jurisdictional contention and also defends the Public Notice on the merits, with support from the Party Committees' response brief and opposition from the Federal Candidates' opening and reply briefs. Following briefing, the parties further aired their positions at an oral argument, conducted during a special sitting of our Court on August 7, 2026, in Richmond.

Notably, in support of its jurisdictional contention, the FCC has emphasized the importance of awaiting the Commission's decision on the Federal Candidates' Application so that this Court will have the benefit of the Commission's expertise. That is, the FCC has contended that even if we could go ahead with a review of the Public Notice, we should allow the Commission to have the first say on the Public Notice's merits. At the same time, the FCC's counsel — speaking for the Commission and the United States — has insisted that the Public Notice is correct.

C.

With this matter poised for our decision, the FCC notified us on August 17, 2026, that there has at last been some action on the Application for FCC Review. Specifically, the FCC advised that its Chairman had circulated a proposed order to his fellow Commissioners three days earlier that — rather than passing on the Public Notice’s merits — would dismiss the Federal Candidates’ Application as an “improper vehicle” for the Commission’s review of the Public Notice. *See Brown v. FCC*, No. 26-1785 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2026), ECF No. 63, at 1 (FCC’s letter to this Court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j)). According to the FCC, the Chairman’s proposed order is premised on the notion that the Public Notice merely restates previous Media Bureau guidance, such that the Application would have the Commission improperly “revisit[] existing law on the eve of an election, after primaries have occurred and plans have been made for the general election based on the existing rules.” *Id.*

Additionally, the FCC proffered a recent order of the Media Bureau denying a petition of the Television Bureau of Advertising, Inc. (“TVB”), for reconsideration of the Public Notice. *See In re Entitlement to Lowest Unit Charge for Legally Qualified Candidates for Federal Office and All Authorized Committees*, DA 26-851, Order on Reconsideration (FCC Aug. 13, 2026). Sticking with the characterization of the Public Notice as a reiteration of previous guidance, the Media Bureau’s order asserts that “[s]uch a reminder is not a decision or action that can be challenged through a petition for reconsideration.” *Id.* at 1. Once again, however, the Media Bureau failed to identify any previous guidance stating that political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-

candidate members can be entitled to the LUC. Instead, the order only vaguely references prior “response[s] to informal inquiries from regulated parties.” *Id.* at 2.

As the FCC would have it, the foregoing developments — the FCC Chairman’s proposed order dismissing the Federal Candidates’ Application, along with the Media Bureau’s order denying TVB’s reconsideration petition — bolster the FCC’s contention that judicial review of the Public Notice cannot be had. In response, the Party Committees concur that this “Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Public Notice” as “a reminder of longstanding guidance.” *See Brown v. FCC*, No. 26-1785, at 1 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026), ECF No. 64 (Party Committees’ response to FCC’s Rule 28(j) letter).

For their part, the Federal Candidates maintain that “[t]he existence of a draft proposed order denying [their Application for FCC Review] confirms additional agency review is futile,” as does “[t]he Media Bureau’s denial of TVB’s reconsideration petition.” *See Brown v. FCC*, No. 26-1785, at 1 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 2026), ECF No. 65 (Federal Candidates’ response to FCC’s Rule 28(j) letter). Additionally, the Federal Candidates underscore that the new developments confirm that the FCC’s “merits argument is weak.” *Id.* The Federal Candidates urge us to proceed with reviewing the Public Notice, while advising that they “will file a second, protective Petition for Review” if the full Commission agrees to an order disposing of their Application. *Id.* at 2.

II.

In these circumstances, we are confident of our jurisdiction to review the Public Notice.⁵ That is, we possess jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (conferring “exclusive jurisdiction” on the courts of appeals “to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of . . . all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by [47 U.S.C. § 402(a)]”). We proceed to explain why the Public Notice constitutes a “final” order “of the Commission” that has been “made reviewable by § 402(a).” Notably, our analysis involves the conclusion that, by its conduct, the Commission has constructively denied the Application for FCC Review and thereby adopted the Public Notice.

A.

We begin with why the Public Notice has been “made reviewable by § 402(a).” Under § 402(a), proceedings to “enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Commission” must be “brought as provided by and in the manner prescribed in [28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351].” In turn, § 2342(1) accords our Court “exclusive jurisdiction” to review “all final orders” of the Commission. Section 2342 also provides that “[j]urisdiction is invoked by filing a petition as provided by section 2344.” For its part, § 2344 sets forth two steps to invoke jurisdiction: (1) the agency provides notice of entering a final order,

⁵ Having assured ourselves that we possess jurisdiction to review the Public Notice, we hereby deny the FCC’s motion to dismiss the Petition for Review.

and (2) an aggrieved party files a petition to review the order within 60 days of the order's entry.

Here, the Media Bureau published its Public Notice on March 30, 2026, starting the 60-day clock for invoking our jurisdiction. *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.103(b), 1.4(b)(4) (explaining that Commission action taken under delegated authority is final, “for purposes of seeking . . . judicial review,” on “the date on which the descriptive ‘Public Notice’ is released”). And because the Federal Candidates filed their Petition for Review before § 2344’s 60-day deadline expired, they properly invoked our jurisdiction.⁶

B.

Next, we explain why the Public Notice is, and always has been, an order “of the Commission.” The Commission is entitled to “delegate any of its functions . . . to a panel of commissioners, an individual commissioner, an employee board, or an individual employee, including functions with respect to hearing, determining, ordering, certifying, reporting, or otherwise acting as to any work, business, or matter.” *See* 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(1). And an order made under such delegation has “the same force and effect” as orders of the Commission. *Id.* § 155(c)(3). Relevant here, the Media Bureau “acts for the Commission under delegated authority” when it “administer[s] and enforce[s] rules and policies regarding political programming and related matters.” *See* 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(e)

⁶ Because the Federal Candidates timely filed the Petition for Review, we need not decide whether § 2344’s 60-day deadline is jurisdictional. We observe, however, that the 60-day deadline is more akin to a “nonjurisdictional rule[] govern[ing] how courts and litigants operate within” the bounds of our “adjudicatory authority.” *See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland*, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023); *cf. Harrow v. Dep’t of Def.*, 601 U.S. 480 (2024).

(citation modified). Thus, from the start, the Public Notice was an order of the Commission. And of course, now that the Commission has constructively denied the Application for FCC Review and thereby adopted the Public Notice, it remains an order of the Commission.

C.

1.

Finally, we explain why the Public Notice is, and always has been, a “final” order. In doing so, we first recognize that the Public Notice was “final” upon issuance by the Media Bureau and remained so after the Federal Candidates filed their Application for FCC Review.

When determining whether an order is final, “courts should take as their NorthStar the unique constellation of statutes and regulations that govern the action at issue.” *See Cal. Cmty. Against Toxics v. EPA*, 934 F.3d 627, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Pursuant to the statutes governing here, an otherwise final order of the Commission, made under delegated authority, becomes nonfinal when the order is “reviewed as provided in [47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4)].” *See* 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(3). Section 155(c)(4) provides a two-step review process: (1) an aggrieved party files an application for review, and (2) the application is “passed upon by the Commission.” So only when review is completed, not merely begun, does an order made under delegated authority become nonfinal. *See Cawthorn v. Amalfi*, 35 F.4th 245, 258 (4th Cir. 2022) (“The past tense is ‘backward-looking’; it refers to things that have already happened, not those yet to come.”); *Participles Generally*, Chicago

Manual of Style § 5.114 (“The past participle denotes the verb’s action as being completed.”).

Indeed, the FCC’s own regulations contemplate the completion of both steps. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.102(b)(3) (“If an application for review of a non-hearing or interlocutory action is filed . . . the Commission may in its discretion *stay the effect* of any such action *until its review of the matters at issue has been completed.*” (emphasis added)); *cf. id.* § 1.102(a)(3) (explaining that, for final actions following review of an initial decision, an application for review automatically stays “the effect of the decision” until the Commission completes its review); *see also id.* § 1.102(b)(1) (“Non-hearing or interlocutory actions taken pursuant to delegated authority shall . . . be effective upon release of the document containing the full text of such action, or in the event such a document is not released, upon release of a public notice announcing the action in question.”). Thus, although the Federal Candidates filed the Application, the Public Notice remained final pending completion of the review process.⁷

2.

In any event, the Public Notice is a “final” order because the Commission, through its own actions — and inaction — has since constructively denied the Application for FCC Review and adopted the Public Notice. Our Court and other courts of appeals have made

⁷ Concluding otherwise would create a “Catch-22 situation” where the filing of an application for review strips the order of finality for purposes of judicial review but not for the effect of the order itself. Here, the Public Notice would go into effect on September 4, 2026, regardless of whether the Commission had passed upon the Federal Candidates’ Application before then. Such a situation is necessarily illogical and intolerable.

it clear that “when administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.” *See Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hardin*, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citing *Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston*, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961)). In this regard, our Court has ruled that “a denial of a request need not be explicit, but rather may be treated as a ‘constructive’ denial based on the decision maker’s conduct.” *See Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n*, 718 F.3d 262, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that a denial of relief may be “actual or constructive, as an indeterminate delay has the same effect as an outright denial”).

The present circumstances readily constitute a constructive denial. When the Federal Candidates initiated this action on June 22, 2026, their Application for FCC Review was pending with the Commission for approximately two months. When we conducted our oral argument earlier this month, the Application was pending for 100 days. On September 4 — the date the LUC requirement becomes effective for the impending November election — it will be 128 days since the Federal Candidates filed their Application.

Despite the time-sensitive nature of these proceedings, the Commission intentionally took no action and offered no response to the Application for more than three months. The Commission did not, for example, seek responses from impacted parties, or engage in fact finding, or secure supplemental briefing, or solicit public comment, or schedule or conduct an oral argument.

Meanwhile, at our oral argument, the FCC’s lawyer admitted — with commendable candor — that “it is very unlikely that the Commission will act here before September 4th.” *See* Oral Argument at 49:49-50:12, *Brown v. FCC*, No. 26-1785 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 2026). Concomitantly, the lawyer also represented to this Court that there would be value in awaiting the Commission’s decision on the Public Notice’s merits and that the Public Notice is, in any event, absolutely correct.

Ten short days later, the Commission finally took some action on the Federal Candidates’ Application. But that action had nothing to do with assessing the merits of the Public Notice either by September 4, 2026, or ever. Rather, the FCC Chairman proposed the summary dismissal of the Application as unreviewable by the Commission.

In these unusual circumstances, we are satisfied that the Commission has constructively denied the Application for FCC Review and thereby adopted the Public Notice. *Cf. Friedman v. FAA*, 841 F.3d 537, 542-43 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding constructive denial where the FAA “placed [the applicant] in a holding pattern” by refusing to issue a formal decision). The Public Notice is “final” for this reason.⁸

3.

The Public Notice also constitutes a “final” order because it is — in both substance and operation — a legislative rule, meaning that the Public Notice is necessarily the law of

⁸ Given that the Commission has effectively adopted the Public Notice, we need not wade into the parties’ dispute as to whether the only statutory precondition to filing the Petition for Review was first filing the Application for FCC Review (as the Federal Candidates contend), or whether 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7) permits judicial review only after the Commission has ruled on the Application (as the FCC argues).

the land and final. As then-Judge Kavanaugh explained in *National Mining Association v. McCarthy*, agency action

that purports to impose legally binding obligations or prohibitions on regulated parties — and that would be the basis for an enforcement action for violations of those obligations or requirements — is a legislative rule.

See 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A legislative rule, sometimes also called a substantive rule, must be distinguished from an interpretive rule. An interpretive rule “simply state[s] what the administrative agency thinks the statute means, and only remind[s] affected parties of existing duties,” or otherwise “clarif[ies] or expl[ains] . . . an existing statute or rule.” *See Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar*, 896 F.3d 615, 620 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).

In that regard, although the Public Notice purports to merely “remind broadcasters and the public about the FCC’s lowest unit charge . . . requirements,” *see* J.A. 1, our Court has long emphasized that whether an agency’s rule is “substantive” or “interpretative” is a pragmatic inquiry; it does not depend on the agency’s self-serving characterizations of the same. *See Jerri’s Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n*, 874 F.2d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that an agency’s “characterization of its statement as an exposition of its policy or interpretation of the standard does not preclude our finding that it is something more”).

Even a passing review of the Public Notice reveals that it is a legislative rule and is thus necessarily final. As discussed *infra*, this Public Notice, at minimum, “supplements a statute,” “adopts a new position [that is] inconsistent with existing regulations,” and otherwise “effects a substantive change in existing law or policy.” *See Children’s Hosp.*,

896 F.3d at 620 (citation modified). The Public Notice leaves broadcasters with “no choice but to comply” with its unlawful expansion of the LUC statute. *See* Br. of Pet’rs 34. And as the Public Notice emphasizes, the LUC is a *requirement*, such that noncompliance by a broadcaster carries with it hefty penalties — including fines, forfeitures, and rebates. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(A) (authorizing \$25,000 per day penalty for violating LUC requirement).

* * *

In sum, we possess jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) to consider and resolve the Federal Candidates’ challenge to the Public Notice. That is because the Public Notice constitutes a “final” order “of the Commission” that has been “made reviewable by § 402(a).”⁹

⁹ In recognizing our jurisdiction, we also reject the FCC’s suggestion that the Federal Candidates lack Article III standing to challenge the Public Notice in federal court. Simply put, the Federal Candidates easily satisfy the requirements for Article III standing. *See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (explaining that Article III standing requires an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and that can be redressed by a favorable court decision).

The Federal Candidates have established a cognizable injury-in-fact by alleging that the Public Notice unlawfully extends the LUC to joint fundraising committees and political parties, thereby reducing the cost of advertising against the Federal Candidates, increasing the volume of opposing advertising they must confront, and placing them at a competitive disadvantage. *See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 414 F.3d 76, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (recognizing that an injury arises when a candidate for federal public office “face[s] intensified competition” under an unlawful regulatory scheme, requiring the candidate to “anticipate and respond to a broader range of competitive tactics than federal law would otherwise allow”). Turning to traceability, there is a “causal connection” between the Media Bureau’s issuance of the Public Notice and the injuries alleged by the Federal Candidates. And finally, concerning the issue of redressability, we may award judicial

(Continued)

III.

Being satisfied that we possess jurisdiction, we turn to the merits of the Federal Candidates' challenge to the Public Notice. And we conclude that, for purposes of entitlement to the LUC under 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A), the term “candidate” means “candidate.” The Public Notice therefore unlawfully requires broadcasters to extend the LUC to political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members.

A.

As a threshold matter, we underscore that the legitimacy of the Public Notice turns on a question of pure statutory interpretation, and that our Court is obliged to “exercise [its own] independent judgment” in conducting that review. *See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024). Put differently, it is “emphatically the province and duty of” our Court — not the FCC — “to say what the law is.” *See id.* (quoting *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).

Notably, parties on each side of this litigation have been accused of speaking with a forked tongue by advancing positions that are contrary to those they have previously taken. The Party Committees contend that one of the Federal Candidates, Sherrod Brown, has benefitted from the very interpretation of the LUC requirement that he now opposes. Specifically, they assert that Brown “benefitted from the application of the LUC rule to

relief that would directly redress the Federal Candidates' injury by setting aside the Public Notice.

[his] own candidate-party coordinated ads . . . in the 2024 election cycle during the World Series.” *See* Br. of Intervenors 9.

The Federal Candidates assert an inconsistency in the FCC’s position, pointing to recent representations made to the Supreme Court by the United States Solicitor General in *National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC*. There, the Solicitor General stated that the LUC statute “require[s] broadcasters to charge low rates for candidate spending, but not for party spending — whether coordinated or independent.” *See* Reply Br. of Federal Resp’ts, *Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm. v. FEC*, No. 24-621, 2025 WL 3068193, at *23 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2025). According to the Federal Candidates, the Solicitor General thus explicitly endorsed their view that political parties are not entitled to the LUC, even when their spending is coordinated with a candidate.

In response to the hypocrisy accusations, both sides contend that such examples are being taken out of context and should hold no weight in assessing the Public Notice. We agree with the latter contention. We need not decide which, if either, party is guilty of speaking with a forked tongue to decide the merits of this dispute. Instead, we simply rely upon the plain text of the LUC requirement and pertinent campaign finance statutes. *See United States v. George*, 946 F.3d 643, 645 (4th Cir. 2020) (“When interpreting a statute, courts must first and foremost strive to implement congressional intent by examining the plain language of the statute.” (citation modified)).

B.

As recited previously, 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A) grants the LUC only “for the use of any broadcasting station by any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public

office in connection with his campaign.” *See also* 47 C.F.R. § 73.1942(a) (same). Given that simple statutory command, it was the FCC that recognized — approximately 35 years ago in 1991 — that “*only candidates* are entitled to [the] lowest unit charge benefits,” and that “independent entities” supporting or opposing candidates are not “entitled to the lowest unit charge.” *See In re Codification of the Comm’n’s Pol. Programming Pol’ys*, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 678, 685 ¶ 34 n.54, 686 ¶ 38 (1991) (emphasis added). The statutory text is unambiguous, and it provides no support for the Media Bureau’s significant and unilateral expansion of the LUC requirement.

Indeed, “absent ambiguity or a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, we apply the plain meaning of the statute.” *See George*, 946 F.3d at 645 (citation modified). And here, the pertinent legislative history is consistent with the LUC requirement’s plain language. Congress enacted the LUC requirement to address a growing “concern about” rate discrimination by broadcasters against candidates for federal office, as well as “the increasing cost[s] of election campaigns.” *See Hernstadt v. FCC*, 677 F.2d 893, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Section 315(b)(1)(A) “regulat[es] rates charged political candidates” and was specifically “viewed [by Congress] as providing an additional break for candidates.” *Id.* It “was intended to ensure that, during the pre-election period, candidates would receive . . . volume and frequency discounts regardless of the number of announcements purchased.” *Id.* at 900.

Moreover, as the Federal Candidates cogently explain, “[i]f Congress had wanted to extend lowest unit charge to party expenditures also, it easily could have said so when it first authorized coordinated expenditures a short two years after passing the lowest unit

charge requirement.” *See* Br. of Pet’rs 22. But Congress refrained from doing so, opting instead to limit the LUC requirement to avoid “imposing unreasonable and possibly economically devastating burdens on small stations.” *See Hernstadt*, 677 F.2d at 898. And when presented with an opportunity to amend the LUC requirement in 2010 and extend the LUC to political parties, Congress declined to do so. *See, e.g.*, DISCLOSE Act, S. 3295, 111th Cong. § 401(a)(1)(c) (2010).

C.

Rather than heeding the plain language of the LUC requirement, the Public Notice requires broadcasters to extend the LUC to political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members, without providing any statutory justification for that rule. That has left the parties herein to debate whether party coordinated expenditures and spending by joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members involve “use . . . by” the candidate within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A).

1.

According to the FCC and the Party Committees, candidate “use” requires only that an advertisement be “authorized by” a candidate. *See* Br. of Resp’ts 43-44; Br. of Intervenors 24, 28. To resolve this question, we again turn to § 315(b)(1)(A)’s plain text.

As a strict textual matter, equating “use” and “authoriz[ation]” makes little sense because “use” by a candidate, and mere “authoriz[ation]” for an advertisement by a candidate, are two distinct concepts. To “authorize” means to “give formal approval to; to sanction, approve, countenance” something done by someone else. *See Authorize*, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Conversely, the term “use” requires “active

employment” by the user. *See Bailey v. United States*, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). Thus, for someone else’s “use” to be the candidate’s “use,” it would not only have to be authorized by the candidate, but done *on behalf* of that candidate. And as discussed, the situations in which that can occur are strictly circumscribed by the pertinent campaign finance statutes.

Consistent with the foregoing, the FCC has long understood that “use” by the candidate requires the candidate’s personal use, not his or her mere authorization of someone else’s use. For example, in its 1984 *Political Primer*, the FCC explained its position that “use” in § 315(b)(1) — and the accompanying entitlement to the LUC — “applie[s] only to the personal use of the radio facilities by the candidates themselves.” *See Political Primer: Law of Political Broadcasting & Cablecasting*, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476, ¶ 32 (1984) (quoting *Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc.*, 186 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1950)). Despite that standard, and the ever-changing landscape of pre-recorded negative and independent advertisements in our national political discourse, the Commission also confirmed in the 1990s that an opponent’s or outside group’s negative advertisements that use a candidate’s voice or picture to attack the candidate are not the targeted candidate’s “use.” *See* 1991 Political Programming Order, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 678, 684 ¶ 30. Positive advertisements that are produced and distributed by “an independent entity,” are also not considered a candidate’s “use,” even if they “include[] an appearance by a candidate.” *See In re Codification of Comm’n’s Pol. Programming Pol’ys*, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 4611, 4614 ¶ 23 (1992).

2.

The question that yet remains is whether Congress included the two beneficiaries of the challenged Public Notice — that is, political parties engaged in coordinated expenditures and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members — when it limited the LUC to “use . . . by” the candidate. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A). For the following reasons, we are satisfied that Congress did not do so.

a.

Starting with political parties engaged in coordinated expenditures, such expenditures are not entitled to the LUC under § 315(b)(1)(A) because they are the political party’s use — not the candidate’s use. That conclusion flows from a commonsense and practical construction of the LUC requirement — a construction of the statutory provision that the FCC has affirmatively agreed with in the past. *See* 1992 Political Programming Order, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 4611, 4614 ¶ 23 (recognizing that the FCC has “always held that *only* candidates or their authorized campaign committees are entitled to the LUC pursuant to [§] 315(b)” (emphasis added)).

Restricting the LUC to candidates and their authorized committees makes good sense because the only way a third-party advertisement could be deemed as “use . . . by” the candidate is when the third-party acts on behalf of the candidate. And pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30101(6), a political committee may make expenditures “on behalf of” a candidate only if it is an “authorized committee” of that candidate. Because political parties support multiple candidates and therefore cannot be authorized committees of a particular candidate, *id.* § 30102(e)(3)(A), such parties cannot act “on behalf of” the

candidate so as to turn their spending into candidate “use.” To conclude otherwise would put the LUC requirement and the campaign finance statutes “at war with one another.” *See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis*, 584 U.S. 497, 502 (2018) (“It is this Court’s duty to interpret Congress’s statutes as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another.”).

We are unpersuaded by the positions espoused by the FCC and the Party Committees. For its part, the FCC insists that its Public Notice “does not cover spending by the party in its own name after consultation with the candidate.” *See* Br. of Resp’ts 43. Yet that is precisely what party coordinated expenditures are — i.e., they are “the party’s expenditures on, for example, advertisements produced or distributed in consultation with a candidate’s campaign.” *See Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm. v. FEC*, 146 S. Ct. 2404, 2413. We thus agree with the Federal Candidates’ assertion that “[i]t is unclear what, exactly, [the FCC] think[s] is entitled to [the] lowest unit charge as a party coordinated expenditure.” *See* Reply Br. of Pet’rs 31.¹⁰

¹⁰ To be sure, the FCC refers to a scenario where “a candidate and [a] political party’s national or state committees together purchase airtime for the campaign’s use.” *See* Br. of Resp’ts 2, 10. If the FCC is suggesting a situation in which a candidate pays part of an advertisement’s cost and the political party foots the bill for the rest, we agree with the Federal Candidates that the “analysis is simple.” *See* Reply Br. of Pet’rs 31. That is, “the candidate’s share is the candidate’s expenditure and therefore the candidate’s ‘use,’ while the party’s share is a party coordinated expenditure — ‘spending by the party in its own name after consultation with a candidate,’ which [the FCC] do[es] not defend as entitled to lowest unit charge.” *Id.*

Alternatively, the FCC describes a scenario where a political party purchases airtime “to distribute to individual candidates for use as [the candidates] choose.” *See* Br. of Resp’ts 40. But that is belied by the Party Committees’ characterization of how party coordinated expenditures actually work in the real world: airtime is not transferrable in that way, and party coordinated expenditures involve the party itself placing orders and (Continued)

Meanwhile, the Party Committees support a different approach. According to the Party Committees, all “candidate-party coordinated [advertisements] are a candidate ‘use’” if the candidate “appear[s] in these [advertisements]” and authorizes a particular advertisement vis-à-vis the “stand by your ad” disclaimer that is required by 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(2)(C). *See* Br. of Intervenors 24. But this defies the FCC’s own treatment of candidate authorization of an individual advertisement as insufficient to entitle an independent entity’s advertisement to lowest unit charge. *See* 1992 Political Programming Order, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 4611, 4613-14 ¶ 23. That is, the FCC has long recognized that “only candidates or their authorized campaign committees are entitled to the LUC,” such that “even if an independent entity produces an advertisement that includes an appearance by a candidate, that independent entity is not entitled to the LUC.” *Id.* And under 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(3), political parties cannot be authorized committees because the parties support multiple candidates.

Not only that, but the plain language of § 315(b)(2) supports the conclusion that the “stand by your ad” disclaimer is not, on its own, enough to entitle an advertisement to the LUC. Section 315(b)(2) does not create eligibility for the LUC; rather, it renders a candidate ineligible for the LUC for failing to agree to comply with or for breaching the “stand by your ad” disclaimer requirement. If § 315(b)(2) were read otherwise, § 315(b)(1)’s test for the LUC — that is, “the use of any broadcasting station by any person

running ads, albeit “candidate-sanctioned” ones. *See* Br. of Intervenors 7-9. As the Party Committees acknowledge, party-coordinated ads are consequently run by party committees. *Id.* at 9-10.

who is a legally qualified candidate” — would be nothing more than surplusage. *Cf. Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, La.*, 146 S. Ct. 1052, 1063 (2026) (recognizing that courts must not “read a statute in a way that makes part of it redundant” (citation modified)).

Ultimately, § 315(b)(1)(A) says what it says, and it does not say that the LUC extends to political parties engaged in coordinated expenditures. Therefore, the Public Notice is contrary to law for expanding the statute to say that it does.

b.

Finally, we assess whether joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members are eligible for the LUC, as prescribed by the Media Bureau’s Public Notice. We conclude that they are not. This analysis is straightforward: The applicable FCC regulations governing the operation of joint fundraising committees ensure that their use is, in substantial part, the use of their non-candidate members, which consequently is not “use . . . by” a legally qualified candidate. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A).

Instead, joint fundraising committees are, in effect, pass-through entities that “collect contributions, pay fundraising costs from gross proceeds and from funds advanced by participants, and disburse net proceeds to each participant.” *See* 11 C.F.R. § 102.17(b)(1). Notably, they do not get their own contribution limits, but they may collect “the total amount that the contributor could contribute to all of the participants” pursuant to the applicable limits, and each participant’s share of the contribution is reported as if it is made directly to the participating committee. *Id.* § 102.17(c)(3)(iii), (5). Similarly,

“expenses” are allocated between the participating committees based on pro-rata shares. *Id.* § 102.17(c)(7)(i)(A).

In this light, the Party Committees take the position that joint fundraising committees are entitled to the LUC because 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(3)(A) provides that such committees may be designated as the “authorized committee” of a participating candidate. *See* Br. of Intervenor 28. But fatal to that contention is the allowance of that designation “solely for the purpose of joint fundraising,” *see* 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Such a designation therefore makes it possible for joint fundraising committees to act “on behalf of” participating candidates when they fundraise for them. *Id.* § 30101(6). But that does not mean that all other acts by joint fundraising committees are undertaken on behalf of their participating candidates.

Undeterred by that reality, the Party Committees assert that § 315’s text provides that “any authorized committee of such candidate” is entitled to the LUC. *See* Br. of Intervenor 21-22. But that is a misconstruction of the relevant statutory language. To reiterate, the LUC requirement is limited to “use . . . by” the candidate, and it says nothing about “authorized committees.” *See* 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A). Rather, “authorized committees” are referenced in § 315(b)(2) — a provision that expressly conditions a candidate’s right to the LUC upon the candidate’s certification that “the candidate (and any authorized committee of the candidate)” will include a disclaimer in any political broadcast. *Id.* § 315(b)(2). As the Federal Candidates aptly explain in reply, “[n]othing about this language suggests that authorized committees are always entitled to lowest unit

charge, regardless of whether a given advertisement involves ‘use . . . by’ a candidate.”
See Reply Br. of Pet’rs 38.

Turning to the FCC’s position on the entitlement of joint fundraising committees to the LUC, the FCC maintains that “[w]hen a [joint fundraising committee] purchases airtime for use by one of its participating candidates, the use of airtime by the candidate . . . qualifies for the LUC rate.” *See* Br. of Resp’ts 37. Incurable in that regard is the FCC’s assumption that “use . . . by” a candidate is at issue in that situation, and the FCC’s disregard of the regulations that govern joint fundraising committees. *See, e.g.*, Reply Br. of Pet’rs 39 (explaining that “regulations governing [joint fundraising committees] define which participant is responsible for which portion of every expenditure, and often mean that the bulk of the expenditure is not, by law, attributable to the candidate”).

At bottom, a joint fundraising committee “cannot be understood to be ‘using’ a broadcaster on behalf of a candidate when it spends money that, under FCC regulations, was contributed to it as a contribution to a non-candidate committee and that must be deemed an expenditure by that non-candidate committee.” *See* Reply Br. of Pet’rs 39. We thus rule that the Media Bureau’s Public Notice illegally expands § 315(b)(1)(A)’s scope to extend the LUC to advertisements purchased by joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members.

* * *

Simply put, the LUC requirement and pertinent campaign finance statutes are clear that neither political parties nor joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members

can be entitled to the LUC. In asserting otherwise, the Public Notice is plainly contrary to law and cannot stand.¹¹

¹¹ It is significant beyond measure that none of the parties in this litigation has raised or pursued a constitutional issue of any sort. Indeed, these appellate proceedings were extensively briefed and well-argued without even a mention of any First Amendment issue. And as we know, the federal courts are not in “the habit of . . . decid[ing] questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.” *See Ashwander v. TVA*, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Nevertheless, our good dissenting colleague seeks to advance a position implicating the canon of constitutional avoidance, expressing concerns about the applicability of the First Amendment. Of importance, however, the constitutional avoidance doctrine “has no application in the absence of [statutory] ambiguity.” *See Warger v. Shauers*, 574 U.S. 40, 50 (2014) (citation modified). And the controlling statutory language in these proceedings —

The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station by any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office in connection with his campaign . . . [must be at] the lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount of time for the same period.

See 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A) — simply says what it says, with no ambiguity in the statute’s plain text.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, although a reviewing court may “construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute or judicially rewriting it.” *See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor*, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (citation modified). Notwithstanding our distinguished friend’s tardy effort to manufacture a constitutional issue in this proceeding, we are not entitled to rewrite the statute. Put simply, as an applicable old proverb reminds us, we cannot “make a silk purse from a sow’s ear.” *See U.S. v. Godwin*, 272 F.3d 659, 681 (4th Cir. 2001).

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we grant the Federal Candidates' Petition for Review and set aside as unlawful and hold for naught the Public Notice issued by the FCC's Media Bureau.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED



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WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join the well-reasoned majority opinion in full. Indeed, it gives the parties and the public adequate notice of the ground rules for the upcoming elections. That laudable objective would be entirely undermined if we accepted the jurisdictional gamesmanship the FCC asks us to employ.

I write separately to emphasize the incontrovertible fact that the *latest* possible date for agency finality is September 4, 2026, when the 60-day period preceding the upcoming elections begins under 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1). Any other considerations are nonjurisdictional, and they are particularly unpersuasive when the sole issue turns on our de novo review of a question of statutory interpretation.

Certainly, the odd procedure at work here brings to mind some of the concerns that the Supreme Court articulated in *Loper Bright*: There are “occasion[s] on which abdication in favor of the agency is *least* appropriate.” *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 401 (2024). Here, adopting the FCC’s position could shift the task of pre-enforcement statutory interpretation entirely to the agency. Under that regime, the FCC may use its delegated authority as a get-out-of-review-free card. First, one of its divisions issues a “public notice” of its broad reinterpretation of a statute. That notice has the “same force and effect” as a rule promulgated by the Commission. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(3). Second, the full Commission does nothing. Third, the new rule goes into effect with no judicial review.¹

¹ The dissent suggests that prolonged inaction by the Commission is “a reasonable concern” that could be alleviated through a writ of mandamus compelling agency action. Diss Op. at 48. But it also recognizes that a several-month delay is generally insufficient (Continued)

That cannot be what Congress intended. And thankfully, precedent does not direct such a dangerous result.

I.

The FCC argues, without legal authority, that we cannot consider constructive denial in our finality analysis.² *See* Response Br. at 27.

Yet finality is a “pragmatic” inquiry. *U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.*, 578 U.S. 590, 599 (2016). And it is uncontroversial that “[b]oth an agency’s failure to act and its affirmative actions are subject to review.” *Sierra Club v. Larson*, 882 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989).

That is why federal appellate courts have long held that “when administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.” *Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hardin*, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citations omitted); *see Int’l Navigators Council of Am. v. Shaffer*, 444 F.2d 904, 910 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (explaining that “administrative inaction” that is “the equivalent of an order denying relief” is “susceptible of direct review”) (quotation omitted). Thus, when an agency has delayed its response “beyond the time in which action could be effective,” a court may determine that “inaction has precisely the

for mandamus relief. *Id.* How mandamus could be a solution to the FCC’s unfettered ability to change broadcast rules in the months before an election eludes me.

² The FCC argues only that constructive denial has never been applied to the Communications Act. Of course, that level of specificity allows it to ignore any instances in which the concept has been applied to other agency action.

same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief.” *Coal. For Sustainable Res., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 259 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001).

To hold otherwise would be to give agencies the unfettered ability to avoid judicial review, in violation of the statutory scheme. According to the FCC, it should be able to employ its delegated authority to take action that is equivalent to actions by the full Commission, ignore any challenges rather than formally deny them, and then allow the time for effective relief to pass without any judicial review of the merits. Under that reading, we should abandon our usual pragmatic approach for a strictly technical rule that hinges on the formality of agency action.

We are not the first to reject such a strained and hyperformal interpretation of finality. In *Friedman v. FAA*, the D.C. Circuit found that the FAA’s refusal to reach a formal determination constituted “a constructive denial” of an airline pilot’s license application. 841 F.3d 537, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The court explained that the applicable test for finality was not “whether there are further administrative proceedings available, but rather whether the impact of the order is sufficiently final to warrant review in the context of the particular case.” *Id.* at 542 (cleaned up).

At oral argument, the FCC agreed that it needed the chance to put its “two cents worth in” before this Court reviews the Media Bureau document. Oral Arg. at 49:05–15, <https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/26-1785-20260807.mp3>. Yet almost immediately thereafter, the agency conceded that “it’s very unlikely the Commission will act here before September 4th.” Oral Arg. at 49:45–50:15. That is precisely the sort of

“vague prospect of reconsideration” that indicates the FCC may permit the deadline for effective action to pass without further discussion. *Friedman*, 841 F.3d at 543.

The agency’s position, in substance, is that it may thwart the judicial review of an operative rule either by postponing its own review until review is no longer meaningful or by declining to act at all. That conception of administrative authority cannot be reconciled with the judicial role. As I reiterate below, an agency may not reserve to itself the power to defeat judicial review through delay or inaction. That is too much power for an agency.

In its subsequent letter to this Court on August 17, the FCC confirmed that it did not intend to review the petitioners’ challenges. Instead, the agency informed us that the Chairman had circulated a proposal to dismiss the petitioners’ application; further, the agency had already dismissed a related request for review from another interested party. *See Brown v. FCC*, No. 26-1785 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2026), Dkt. No. 63. In other words, the FCC has no intention of using any of its potential “power to persuade” us in this case, as the dissent asserts it must.³ *See Diss. Op.* at 51.

Yet without relief, the parties agree that on September 4, 2026, broadcasters will be obligated to offer the lowest-unit charge to qualified parties. *See Oral Arg.* at 55:00–25;

³ Moreover, the practical benefits of a formal decision from the Commission are minimal in this case. Statutory interpretation is “exclusively a judicial function,” and we owe no deference to the agency’s interpretation. *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 387 (2024). To be sure, there may be situations in which we are persuaded by an agency’s opinion “to the extent it rests on factual premises within [the agency’s] expertise.” *Id.* at 402 (quotation omitted). But here, the parties acknowledge that the single merits issue is one of pure statutory interpretation.

47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1) (lowest-unit charge in effect 60 days before a general election). Those who fail to heed the FCC’s latest interpretation of § 315(b) “do so at the risk of significant . . . civil penalties.” *Hawkes*, 578 U.S. at 600; *see* 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(A) (describing penalties up to “\$25,000 for each violation or each day of a continuing violation”). Thus, broadcasters will be put in the difficult position of either (1) risking those penalties or (2) selling broadcast time at a lower rate to the additional groups that the agency identifies.⁴

II.

The FCC also argues that we must conclude that a final agency action occurred before the petitioners filed their petition for review in this Court, arguing that a too-early filing has jurisdictional consequences. Not so.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2344, parties “aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order” in this Court. In the past, courts have tied the commencement of the 60-day period to their jurisdiction, such that a petition filed too

⁴ Though the FCC attempts to persuade us otherwise, it is clear that the volume of broadcast time that these groups would purchase under the lowest-unit charge would be a sea change. For example, before the Supreme Court’s decision in *National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC*, “party-coordinated expenditures in House races have never exceeded 1% of total campaign spending.” 146 S. Ct. 2404, 2433 (2026) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Additionally, the FCC’s submission of the 2024 National Association of Broadcasting Handbook shows that additional committees, such as joint fundraising committees, demanding the lowest-unit charge “has become a more frequent situation” only in “recent years,” and “[s]tatements should consult their attorney if confronted with” such a request. Attachment to Response Br. at 7.

early was “incurably premature.” *Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. F.C.C.*, 503 F.3d 284, 287 (3d Cir. 2007).

But in recent years, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “most time bars are nonjurisdictional.” *Harrow v. Dep’t of Def.*, 601 U.S. 480, 484 (2024) (quotation omitted). Thus, we should “treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” *Id.* (quotation omitted). Such a clear statement would “speak[] to a court’s authority to hear a case” rather than simply speak in mandatory terms to petitioners. *Id.* at 485. Thus, the Supreme Court read a requirement in a similar statute—which stated that “any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board”—as nonjurisdictional and likely subject to equitable exceptions. *Id.* (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)); *see id.* at 489.

I see no defensible distinction between that language and § 2344’s 60-day filing deadline. Thus, whether the petition was early is irrelevant to our jurisdictional analysis, so long as we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction when we rule on the merits of the petition.⁵

⁵ The dissent asserts that, even if it is nonjurisdictional, the 60-day requirement is a mandatory claims-processing rule, not an “optional deadline.” Diss. Op. at 44 n.1. But the petitioners have not blown past a deadline. The FCC instead claims that they have petitioned us too *early*. Indeed, we have explained that even a premature notice of appeal—for which lateness would have jurisdictional consequences—becomes “effective” if the district court issued a final order while the appeal is pending. *In re Bryson*, 406 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).

III.

Finally, it bears emphasis that the statutory and regulatory scheme before us is an unusual one. Congress did not itself create the Media Bureau. Rather, it authorized the Commission to delegate its functions and provided that any action taken pursuant to such delegated authority “shall have the same force and effect” as action taken by the Commission itself. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(3); *see* § 155(c)(1). Acting under that authority, the Commission created the Media Bureau and vested it with responsibility for administering and enforcing the Commission’s “rules and policies” governing political programming.⁶ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(e).

The consequence is straightforward. When the Media Bureau acts pursuant to delegated authority, its order binds regulated parties without awaiting any further action by the Commission. It takes effect; it imposes obligations; and it speaks with the authority Congress has accorded to the Commission’s delegate. In every practical sense, therefore, such an order is final when issued by the Media Bureau. Yet the statutory scheme permits

⁶ It bears repeating that this power, if unchecked by judicial review, could give the agency the wholesale power to rewrite statutes. Here, the attempt is to add joint fundraising committees and national party committees to § 315(b)(1). The dissent avoids the rewriting that is required to slot these additional groups into the statute by lumping them together in its analysis. *See* Diss. Op. at 56-57. Thus, the dissent sidesteps the clear textual problem: Everyone agrees that party committees are not authorized committees in these circumstances, yet the statute requires a candidate who is claiming the lowest-unit charge to state both “that the candidate has approved the broadcast and *that the candidate’s authorized committee paid for the broadcast.*” 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(2)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). After avoiding this Achilles heel, the dissent then employs an unbriefed constitutional argument about discrimination against party-coordinated speech. Diss. Op. at 60-68. It then arrives at a construction that happens to also favor joint fundraising committees. That is too much for the text to bear.

the Commission to consider a challenge to that order while the order remains in force. That result is an unusual asymmetry: A Media Bureau order operates with the full force of a Commission order even as the Commission considers whether that order should stand.

The peculiarity becomes more pronounced when § 155(c)(3) is read alongside § 155(c)(7). Congress has authorized the Commission to delegate to the Media Bureau the power to issue operative orders carrying “the same force and effect” as Commission orders. At the same time, Congress requires a party aggrieved by delegated action to seek Commission review as a “condition precedent to judicial review.” 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7). The Commission would transform that exhaustion requirement into something quite different: a means by which its own delegate may issue a binding order, while the Commission withholds the very action that, in the Commission’s view, is necessary before a court may review the order.

Surely, Congress did not permit the Commission to have it both ways—empowering its own Media Bureau to speak with the Commission’s full legal force when imposing obligations on regulated parties, while at the same time allowing the Commission to thwart any meaningful judicial review of a Media Bureau’s order by unduly delaying its own action or declining to act at all. This is especially subject to abuse in highly time-sensitive matters such as the one before us. That’s too much power for an agency to possess without an explicit grant from Congress.

IV.

In sum, neither statute nor precedent directs us to throw up our hands when an agency acts in a way that is, for all practical purposes, final. Indeed, when confronted with

novel paths that may thwart judicial review, we should reconfirm our “background presumption of judicial review” of agency actions. *McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp.*, 606 U.S. 146, 157 (2025).



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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Collaboration between candidates and parties “has formed the essence of our Nation’s party system of government” since the Founding. *National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC*, 146 S. Ct. 2404, 2416 (2026). What a shame the majority assaults that very “essence” in this very case.

In striking that blow, the majority first transgresses its jurisdictional bounds. Our jurisdiction is limited to “final orders” of the Federal Communications Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 2342; 47 U.S.C. § 402. The FCC is presently considering an “application for review” brought by the same petitioners before us here. In both fora, petitioners make the same arguments and seek the same relief: a modification or reversal of the rule laid out in the FCC Media Bureau’s Public Notice. While the Commission reviews the application, the Public Notice before us is not a final order. This court may not sit in judgment of the Commission until the Commissioners complete their statutory duty to “pass[] upon” the application and decide whether to adopt the Public Notice. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4).

But if we *had* jurisdiction, the First Amendment would disfavor petitioners’ view of ambiguous statutory text. The majority says that the Communications Act denies Lowest Unit Charge (LUC) rates to candidates speaking via party-coordinated advertisements, whether such coordination is direct or the functional product of Joint Fundraising Committee expenditures. But Congress cannot dangle lower rates for *some* candidate speech as a means of penalizing *other* candidate speech. The differentiated advertisement rates sought by petitioners degrade both the “important and traditional role of political

parties during campaigns” and the collaborative speech between candidate and party that role creates. *NRSC*, 146 S. Ct. at 2415.

Because I disagree with the majority both about our jurisdiction and about the inferior place the majority assigns to protected collaborative speech, I respectfully dissent.

I.

The Communications Act and the Hobbs Act govern whether our court is fit to decide this case and to decide it now. 47 U.S.C. § 155; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342–44. Read properly, those statutes work together to prohibit us from exercising jurisdiction at this time.

The FCC Commissioners are a bipartisan group of five principal officers appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 47 U.S.C. § 154. Congress made clear that those individuals should review and refine the work of FCC staff members before that work may be challenged in federal court. *Id.* §§ 155(c)(4), (7). Congress undoubtedly recognized the value of the Commissioners deliberating, providing an explanation of their reasons, and signing their names in support of—or in opposition to—the policy expressed in the staff decision.

My colleagues in the majority fail to respect those worthy aims and wrest jurisdiction from the FCC before the Commissioners can perform the role Congress assigned to them. The majority’s choice to proceed to the merits undermines Congress’s statutory scheme and disempowers the most politically accountable actors within the Commission.

A.

The Communications Act authorizes the Commission to delegate to its staff the power to issue certain decisions. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(1). Aggrieved parties who seek to challenge actions taken on delegated authority must proceed in two steps.

First, they must seek agency review by filing an “application for review” before the full Commission within 30 days of public notice of a decision by FCC staff. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7); 47 C.F.R. § 1.115(d). Once an application is filed, the Commission has a mandatory obligation to act on the application. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4) (“[E]very such application *shall* be passed upon by the Commission”) (emphasis added).

At step two, aggrieved parties may file a “petition for review” in federal court. *Id.* § 155(c)(7). A “condition precedent” to filing the petition for review in a federal court is “[t]he filing of an application for review” in front of the full Commission. *Id.* The Communications Act provides that “[t]he time within which a petition for review [in a federal court] must be filed . . . shall be computed from the date upon which public notice is given of orders disposing of all applications for review” before the Commission. *Id.*

The Communications Act then provides for judicial review by adopting the procedural requirements contained in the Hobbs Act. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (invoking 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342–44). The Hobbs Act states that any aggrieved party may “file a petition” for review in the appropriate federal court “within 60 days after” the entry of a “final order.” 28 U.S.C. § 2344.

B.

The jurisdictional question at hand is thus a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation. Judicial review is unavailable until the FCC renders a final order. There is no final order here because the full Commission is still formulating its final decision. The Communications Act and the Hobbs Act together strip us of jurisdiction to hear a petition for review unless it is filed in the 60-day window that begins at the point when the Commission “dispos[es] of all applications for review.” 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7); 28 U.S.C. § 2344. We may not enlarge our jurisdiction on a whim.

Petitioners seek to complicate the matter because they lack a strong statutory argument. According to petitioners, those complaining of action taken by FCC staff may seek judicial review as soon as they *file* an application for review asking the full Commission to set aside or modify the action. Noting that the Communications Act requires “filing” an application for review before the full Commission as “a condition precedent to judicial review,” 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7), petitioners argue that Congress must have meant to imply that the FCC need not *resolve* the application before courts can step in.

This is a myopic interpretation of what Congress intended. Petitioners invoke jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act, which requires petitions for review in courts of appeals to be filed “within 60 days after . . . entry” of a “final order” of the Commission. *See* Pet. for Review at 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342(1), 2344; 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). “The obligation to file within [the] sixty-day window” imposed by the Hobbs Act “is jurisdictional in nature, and may not be enlarged or altered by the court . . . absent ‘exceptional’ circumstances.” *Bhd.*

of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 972 F.3d 83, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted).¹

Therefore, to say that a petition for review is timely before the Commission has even “dispos[ed] of all applications for review” pending before it impermissibly enlarges the filing window. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7). As then-Judge Scalia noted, “[i]f the intent were to establish a filing deadline rather than a filing window, it would more naturally have been phrased ‘no later than 60 days after . . . entry’ rather than ‘within 60 days after . . . entry.’” *W. Union Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 773 F.2d 375, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over a premature appeal of an FCC order).

Of course, decisions made by FCC staff carry undeniable weight. An “order, decision, report, or action” by Commission staff under delegated authority has “the same force and effect” as an action taken by the Commission itself. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(3). If no one asks the full Commission to review a staff decision, perhaps it becomes final because it “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process” on the matter. *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quotation omitted). But after the petitioners

¹ *Harrow v. Department of Defense*, 601 U.S. 480 (2024), holds that the deadline for review of decisions by the Merits System Protection Board is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule. It does not address the Hobbs Act’s 60-day window, which lower courts have generally treated as jurisdictional. *See, e.g., Consumers’ Research v. FCC*, 67 F.4th 773, 784 (6th Cir. 2023); *Commonwealth Edison Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n*, 830 F.2d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 1987); *Key Med. Supply, Inc. v. Burwell*, 764 F.3d 955, 963 (8th Cir. 2014); *Consumers’ Research v. FCC*, 88 F.4th 917, 922 (11th Cir. 2023). Even if those lower courts are wrong, a mandatory claims-processing window is still no optional deadline. *See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert*, 586 U.S. 188, 192 (2019); *Manrique v. United States*, 581 U.S. 116, 121 (2017) (noting that such rules are “unalterable” if “properly raise[d]”).

filed an application for review—which obligated the full Commission to review the Public Notice—the FCC’s decisionmaking process carried on. So, there is not yet a final order from which to measure any 60-day window.² It cannot be final because the Commission is still considering the question.

C.

Petitioners’ argument that merely *filing* an application for review provides this court with jurisdiction would demand an audacious act of judicial overreach. That argument disrespects the value of agency finality, namely the benefit of having a complete, collective judgment of the most accountable agency officials before judicial review commences. The full Commission must have an opportunity to “pass[] upon” petitioners’ application for review before our task begins. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4).

By allowing an appeal at this stage, the majority creates two parallel tracks of redundant litigation and cuts the Commissioners out of the picture where Congress required their involvement. It makes little sense to think that Congress envisioned two separate proceedings in a race against one another. But accepting jurisdiction here allows future

² It does not matter whether the policy embodied in the Public Notice is a legislative rule or an interpretive rule. *See* Maj. Op. at 15–16. Even if its terms are more “substantive” than “interpretive,” *id.*, Congress has barred judicial review until the Commission disposes of petitioners’ application. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Only after the Commission has weighed in may the “substantive” or “interpretive” nature of the policy bear on its reviewability. *See Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (“First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” (quotation omitted)). The first prong is missing here until the Commission addresses petitioners’ application. A legislative rule is only “necessarily final,” Maj. Op. at 16, with respect to *Bennett*’s second prong.

complainants to challenge FCC staff decisions in a near-simultaneous one-two punch: they can quickly file both an application for review before the FCC and a petition for review in a federal court. Perhaps future filings will be minutes apart.

Worse yet, accepting jurisdiction here not only undermines *efficiency*, it subverts *accountability*. Agencies are creatures of Congress. Rules Congress imposes on agencies may strike courts as ill-advised, but those rules are often products of Congress's desire to ensure that those making policy in the executive branch face accountability for any missteps or abuses. *See United States v. Arthrex*, 594 U.S. 1, 16 (2021). The FCC Commissioners, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, tether this agency to the people through their elected representatives, creating "lines of accountability." *Id.* Functionally erasing Commission-level review from the text of the Communications Act allows Commissioners to evade accountability by shunning Congress's command that they weigh in with their considered judgment and put their views on the record. Disregarding that mandate muddies up the public's effort to ascertain "on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure . . . ought really to fall." *Id.* (quoting *The Federalist* No. 70, at 476 (A. Hamilton)).

Other courts have uniformly recognized the necessity of Commissioner review of FCC staff decisions. *See Alabama Power Co. v. FCC*, 311 F.3d 1357, 1366 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The petitioners must give the Commission an opportunity to issue a final decision; otherwise, the statutory prerequisite [of filing an application for review] would be rendered useless."); *Council Tree Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC*, 503 F.3d 284, 287 (3d Cir. 2007); *Ga. Power Co. v. Teleport Commc'ns Atlanta, Inc.*, 346 F.3d 1047, 1050 (11th Cir. 2003); *Int'l*

Telecard Ass’n v. FCC, 166 F.3d 387, 387–88 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). My colleagues do not discuss the precedents with which they disagree, and they can point to no case recognizing a right to judicial review of an FCC staff order while the full Commission considers the same petitioner’s application for review of that order.

Instead, my colleagues note that Section 155(c)(3) grants actions taken under Commission-delegated authority “the same force and effect” as actions “of the Commission,” “unless reviewed as provided in [Section 155(c)(4)].” Maj. Op. at 11–12. So, the majority claims, an order must have that “same force and effect”—i.e., it must be final—until the Commission has *finished* reviewing it. *Id.* at 12. “[O]nly when review is completed, not merely begun, does an order made under delegated authority become nonfinal.” *Id.*

That is a puzzling construction: it is unclear how *the completion of Commission review* could be the thing that makes an order “nonfinal.” The true meaning of Section 155(c)(3)’s “unless” clause is much simpler. It just means that the Commission could, in disposing of an application for review, overturn a staff decision, which would eliminate its “force and effect.” That risk underscores the non-finality of the staff decision while the Commission’s review proceeds. It may be true that staff orders are final if no party ever asks for Commission review. But once an application *is* brought before the full Commission, we know the staff action will not be the FCC’s last word on the matter, because the FCC is obligated to review that application. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4). How indeed could a staff memo be seen as a “final order” once the Commission has been legally bound to consider modifying or rejecting it?

I understand that petitioners feel they are in a bind because judicial review is conditioned on first asking the Commission for relief. *Id.* § 155(c)(7) (requiring an order “disposing of all applications for review”). But those are the rules Congress applied to their situation. Judicial review is unavailable until the full Commission reviews petitioners’ application.

D.

The majority highlights what I view to be a reasonable concern: what if the Commission never acts on an application for review? Is it possible for the FCC to evade review of an unlawful decision so long as the Commission (1) delegates to its staff the authority to make the decision, and (2) indefinitely holds applications for review challenging the decision?

I think not. If the Commission were to attempt to table an application indefinitely, the Commission would be violating the law. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4) (“[E]very . . . application shall be passed upon by the Commission.”). The use of “shall” in the statute indicates a mandatory duty that must be undertaken. *Bufkin v. Collins*, 604 U.S. 369, 379 (2025) (“It is undisputed that the word ‘shall’ imposes a mandatory command. ‘Shall’ means ‘must.’” (citation omitted)).

For that reason, as the FCC recognizes, this court has jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the agency to render its final decision. Resp. Br. at 28. The D.C. Circuit, when confronted with similar claims of “unreasonable delay,” has asked “whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” *Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC*, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984); *cf. In re Core*

Communications, 531 F.3d 849, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (considering a seven-year delay by the FCC “egregious” and issuing a writ of mandamus).

While mandamus is a rare and extraordinary remedy, courts may calibrate their discretion to issue the writ and act more aggressively when the circumstances warrant it. *See U.S. ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern*, 289 U.S. 352, 359 (1933) (emphasizing that the mandamus remedy is “controlled by equitable principles”). That said, it is inconceivable for mandamus to be appropriate here after two months of agency inaction. To be sure, the Commission need not sit on its hands for seven years for mandamus to be appropriate, *see In re Core Communications*, 531 F.3d at 850, but two months in a difficult and complex case such as this one is plainly not egregious. Besides, judges are not in a strong position to question the agency’s relative priorities or to formulate a view of how long disposing of any given application “should” take, given that courts themselves are not often models of alacrity.

After a writ of mandamus has issued, further inaction and delay evincing an intent to evade judicial review may render it appropriate for a court to consider an application “passed upon” and effectively denied by the Commission. *See Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hardin*, 428 F.2d 1093, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970). However, considering *this* application constructively denied before mandamus, as the majority holds, is untenable. Maj. Op. at 13. Countless future FCC staff decisions are vulnerable to hasty appeal under the majority’s reasoning, short-circuiting the Commission’s internal review process in much the same way as the majority’s view of the jurisdictional statutes.

E.

A hasty constructive-denial timeline is especially improper in the circumstances of this case. The majority proposes nothing less than an upending of settled campaign finance ground rules right in the middle of an election season. Throughout this year's primary season broadcasters have *already* provided LUC rates to groups the majority excludes from LUC eligibility. *See, e.g.*, 28(j) Response of Intervenors at 2 n.1 (ECF 64) (comparing advertising purchases in the 2026 New Hampshire Senate race). If allowed to remain in effect through the date of this year's general elections, the Public Notice will simply apply the same consistent standards to the entire election season.

Nor did the Public Notice change the status quo in the first place. Instead, as petitioners concede, party-coordinated ads received LUC rates in prior election cycles, too. *See* Pet. Reply Br. at 35; *see also* Br. of Intervenors at 8–12. At worst, petitioners will keep facing for a few more months the LUC rules under which they have long labored—and, at times, profited. *See* Br. of Intervenors at 9–10 (listing cases in which Petitioner Brown received LUC for party-coordinated ads, as well as similar cases for candidates backed by intervenors). At the very least, constructive denial demands more agency neglect than a two-month hesitation in upending longstanding election rules.

The majority's constructive-denial holding instead tells the FCC that, moving forward, our court will ignore its internal review process unless it renders a decision in two months or less. Courts themselves take longer when the complexity of the action or the internal process of the court demands it. I am unwilling in these circumstances to accept

jurisdiction and run roughshod over Congress's command that the agency "pass[] upon" and "dispos[e] of" petitioners' application for review. 47 U.S.C. §§ 155(c)(4), (7).

F.

A few final points merit comment. First, it is important in discussing the interplay between Congress, courts, and agencies to take account of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in *Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). When Congress asks an agency to produce a reasoned interpretation of law for courts to review, those reasons still have value after *Loper Bright* because they "constitute[] a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants [may] properly resort for guidance,' even on legal questions." *Id.* at 388 (quoting *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 139–140 (1944)).

The Commission has the "power to persuade" us in this case especially because we are confronting intricate questions of campaign finance law that the agency has encountered before and on which the agency maintains institutional knowledge. *See, e.g., The Law of Political Broadcasting & Cablecasting: Political Primer*, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476 (1984); *In the Matter of Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 4611 (1992). Much remains unclear based on the record we have. I, for one, would like to hear a full explanation of the Commissioners' views.

To say that the Commission's expertise is irrelevant is not only an insult to the Commission. It is an insult to Congress, which explicitly determined that the Commission "shall" "pass[] upon" applications for review and explain itself before this court could

weigh in. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4). If we were to suggest that the perspectives of the Commissioners are worthless, we would be substituting our own policy judgment for that of the legislative branch.

Lastly, this court received a 28(j) letter from the FCC on August 17, 2026. Supplemental Authorities (ECF 63-1). The letter informs us that the Commission's wheels are indeed turning: the Chair has circulated a draft order on which the Commissioners may vote. *Id.* at 1. Regardless of the content of the draft order, which we cannot yet read, the fact that it has been circulated only reinforces the lack of a final judgment of the Commission. The majority is stepping on the Commission's toes as the Commission stands in the middle of its deliberations. My colleagues consider petitioners' application constructively denied, suggesting that the Commissioners are "refusing to issue a formal decision," Maj. Op. at 15, even though the Commission has telegraphed that it is on the precipice of issuing its decision. We do not have jurisdiction in this case until the Commission adopts the order and disposes of petitioners' application. That is what Congress required. 47 U.S.C. §§ 155(c)(4), (7).

* * *

Either there is a final order or there is not. At this point there is not. The full Commission has not acted. So we lack jurisdiction. Jumping the gun is bad business, and, in this case, will upend settled rules in the middle of an election season. The majority cites various exigencies to justify its course, but it is all too easy for courts to contrive exigencies to achieve congenial results. Its decision will only facilitate premature interference with agency proceedings in many other contexts.

In the end, we are not authorized to ignore the congressional judgment that full agency deliberations here have something worthwhile to contribute. Jurisdictional rules determine what courts may and may not do. Take heed.

II.

We lack jurisdiction at this time and should not have reached the merits. Since the majority does so, I must address that portion of its opinion as well. I would note once again, however, that this is an especially inopportune time for courts to be fine-tuning campaign finance ground rules in the run up to a general election.

The text of the Communications Act, though ambiguous, accommodates, and may indeed favor, the FCC's view. But if petitioners are right about the text, I worry that the statute brushes against the First Amendment by favoring some forms of candidate speech over others. I would avert that threat by resolving any doubts in favor of the Constitution.

A.

47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1) provides LUC rates “for the use of any broadcasting station by any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office in connection with his campaign for nomination for election, or election.” The trouble comes in the undefined phrase, “use” by a “candidate.” The FCC reads “use” broadly, petitioners narrowly. The FCC has the stronger of two plausible approaches to ambiguous text.

Consider the different ways a candidate could “use” a broadcasting station, starting with a minimalist view. A candidate could take his own, personal funds, and purchase an advertisement. Under a very narrow, literal view of “use,” the statute might offer LUCs only for such purchases.

But “use” cannot be quite so narrow as that. As petitioners themselves note, “[e]veryone agrees that stations must offer lowest unit charge for advertisements purchased by [candidates’] principal campaign committees on behalf of the ‘legally qualified candidate’ they support.” Mot. to Expedite (ECF 8-1) at 5. That consensus is eminently sensible. Federal law requires every candidate for federal office to establish such a “principal campaign committee,” and a candidate usually pays for campaign expenses via such a committee. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(1). Besides, if the LUC goes to ads purchased via personal funds, but not ones purchased via principal campaign committees, it is just a handout to rich candidates. To avoid that prospect, a candidate must be “using” the broadcasting station even when his principal campaign committee is the one footing the bill.

B.

If a candidate can “use” a station via his principal committee, perhaps he can do the same via other committees, too. The same statute that *requires* federal candidates to designate principal campaign committees *allows* them to designate “authorized committees.” *Id.* Those authorized committees include the “joint fundraising committees,” or JFCs, at issue here. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(3)(A)(ii).

In recent practice, a JFC is a means to run candidate ads in coordination with a political party. It is a fundraising committee that includes both the candidate’s own principal committee and other members, chief among them party committees. *See* Pet. Br.

at 7–9.³ The JFC raises money and uses it to run advertisements. But the advertisements a JFC runs are functionally just advertisements for the candidate. So, for example, a JFC advertisement might close with a QR code that links to a JFC-specific donation page, but otherwise showcases an ordinary candidate appearance or blurb. *See id.* (describing trend of JFC advertisements “nearly indistinguishable from ordinary campaign ads”).

Such a JFC advertisement, from a viewer’s perspective, looks like “use” by a “candidate.” *See* Pet. Br. at 8–9; Br. of Campaign Legal Center as Amicus Curiae at 11–13 (describing example from campaign of Sen. Jon Tester). It typically includes a candidate appearance and a candidate message, and it is paid for by a committee that the candidate authorized. *See id.* Existing FCC regulations already embody that intuition by defining “use” as “a candidate appearance (including by voice or picture).” 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941(b).

The statutory text supports this more expansive understanding of “use.” Under 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(2)(A), a “candidate for Federal office . . . shall not be entitled to receive [the LUC] for the use of any broadcasting station unless the candidate provides written certification to the broadcast station that the candidate (*and any authorized committee of the candidate*) shall not make any direct reference to another candidate for the same office.” (emphasis added).

³ A JFC could in theory be formed without a party committee. *See* 11 C.F.R. § 102.17(a)(1)(i). Petitioners, however, object to party-dominated JFCs in their briefing, and amici likewise discuss only JFCs that include party committees as members. *See* Br. of Campaign Legal Center as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. 45, at 9–18. Accordingly I express no view at this time on the LUC rules as applied to JFCs without such party members.

That reference to “authorized committee[s]” could mean two things. First, a candidate who wants an LUC rate must agree to separate restrictions on his authorized committee—even though the committee does *not* get the LUC—if he wants the LUC for himself. But it would be very strange to ask a candidate to make a pledge about the actions of his authorized committees to obtain the LUC for himself alone. Besides, it is odd to say that JFC “use” of a broadcast station is not the candidate’s “use” if the candidate has the power to make pledges about what kind of content the JFC can or cannot air.⁴

Instead, a second, broader reading of “use” is more plausible: namely, that authorized-committee ads are a subset of candidate ads, a subset subject to the same LUC-related restrictions because, like other “use” by a “candidate,” it qualifies for the LUC.

C.

Petitioners reject this interpretation because of a JFC’s party-coordinated nature. As their briefing helpfully explains, party committee members “often completely dominate JFC fundraising.” *See* Pet. Br. at 25. Most gross revenue is allocated to party committee members, who then, in turn, under FEC regulations, also bear the vast majority of JFC advertising expenses. *See id.* at 26; 11 C.F.R. § 102.17(c)(6)–(7). And, as petitioners’ counsel put it at oral argument, “Under FECA, every dollar that is spent in a federal election is spent by some one organization. In other words, there’s no concept of a joint purchase

⁴ The majority argues that such a reading would make “use” by a “candidate” redundant. *See* Maj. Op. at 25–26. That is incorrect; under this broader reading, “authorized committee” would be explaining and defining “use” by a “candidate,” not supplanting that phrase.

that is not divisible.” Oral Argument at 20:22-20:33. So, the argument goes, JFC ads cannot be *candidate* speech—they must be *party* speech.

That view presents a false dichotomy, one the majority uncritically adopts. *See* Maj. Op. at 26–28. Given “the important and traditional role of political parties during campaigns,” *National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC*, 146 S. Ct. 2404, 2415 (2026), it is wrong to say that party-coordinated speech is either just candidate speech or just party speech. Perhaps Congress could have demanded such attribution by limiting the LUC to advertisements *paid for* by a candidate (or a party, or some other entity). That would match petitioners’ characterization of FECA as a statute in which “every *dollar that is spent* in a federal election is spent by some one organization.” (emphasis added). But in the LUC context Congress attached attribution to *use*, not payment, selecting a term whose ordinary meaning permits multiple actors.

Grafting a narrow meaning of “use” onto the statute distorts that term in a way especially unsuited to the campaign environment. Political campaigns are not, and never have been, siloed, isolated affairs, which allow the neat attribution of speech to only one actor at a time. JFC speech is multi-person speech—that is the whole point of coordination, and the very reason the committee is a “joint” one. A candidate does not stop “using” a broadcast station just because his or her authorized message employs a party-coordination mechanism.

Of course, the FCC’s rule extends beyond JFCs to embrace some other party-coordinated speech, too. Candidate advertisements are formally “party-coordinated” when they meet regulatory standards for candidate involvement, but are paid for by a party. *See*

11 C.F.R. § 109.37 (defining party-coordinated communications); 52 U.S.C. § 30120(a)(2) (contemplating advertisements purchased by parties but authorized by candidates). But the same logic still applies—coordination alone does not keep a candidate from “using” a station, because the very nature of coordination is multi-person use. It is unsurprising, then, that broadcasters have routinely offered LUCs to party-coordinated candidate ads. *See* Intervenor Br. at 8–12.

Some party speech is obviously not candidate use. For example, a party might run an advertisement for the *party*, without mentioning any particular candidate, or without seeking any candidate’s authorization. That would not be candidate “use” in any ordinary sense of the term. *See* Br. of Intervenor at 26 (disclaiming entitlement to LUC for such advertisements). But a party-coordinated advertisement that features a candidate’s image and speech and message, and is authorized by the candidate, does seem like “use” by the candidate, even if it is “use” by the party, too.

III.

Today’s statutory disagreement is no ordinary difference of opinion between litigants. At stake is political speech at the heart of the election season, and hence at the heart of the First Amendment. It is therefore proper to consult that amendment in resolving statutory doubts.

The FCC’s reading of “use” by a “candidate” is a natural and plausible one, given the fact that candidate-party coordinated speech remains a species of candidate speech alone. But the FCC’s position is hardly a slam dunk. The phrase “use” by a “candidate” retains some inherent ambiguity.

The Constitution resolves it. “When legislation and the Constitution brush up against each other, our task is to seek harmony, not to manufacture conflict.” *United States v. Hansen*, 599 U.S. 762, 781 (2023). Here, that harmony favors the FCC.

A.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that petitioners rightly apprehend the Communications Act. If so, I fear, they misapprehend the First Amendment. As a rule, Congress “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.” *Agency for Intern. Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Intern., Inc.*, 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013) (quoting *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc.*, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)) (internal punctuation omitted). Congress had no obligation to create any “Lowest Unit Charge” scheme for ads by political candidates. Having done so, however, Congress cannot escape First Amendment scrutiny by using the benefit to candidates to deny comparable speech-enhancing benefits to closely coordinating entities. Allowing such denials risks smothering political speech severely.

As explained above, whatever the precise statutory meaning of “use,” candidates for federal office do speak in many ways. Sometimes they pay for advertisements directly, out of their own pockets. More commonly their principal campaign committee purchases advertisements on their behalf. And they can also speak by coordinating advertisements with national political parties. A candidate’s authorship of speech does not end because another speaker joins him.

Under petitioners' statutory construction, the Communications Act favors some of these modes of candidate speech while disfavoring others. It offers the LUC to independent candidate speech—personal ad purchases or principal campaign committee ad purchases. But it denies the LUC to party-coordinated speech, like JFC-purchased advertisements and regular party-coordinated ad buys. This is an unfortunate attempt to disfavor those kinds of speech, a penalty the First Amendment forbids.

B.

Statutory discrimination against party-coordinated speech is unsurprising here, because the LUC statute was passed as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which also placed broader, direct limits on party-coordinated speech. *See* Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 4; 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d). The Supreme Court initially upheld those limits in *Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.*, 533 U.S. 431, 437 (2001). Now, however, FECA's party-coordination limits are gone, struck down by the Supreme Court as antithetical to the First Amendment. *See NRSC*, 146 S. Ct. at 2428.

Before us in the present case is a kind of mop-up duty: we must decide whether Congress can do indirectly, via the LUC rules, what it cannot do directly—disfavor various kinds of party-coordinated spending. To complete that task, we must, of course, go beyond *NRSC*'s rule of decision. An end to party-coordinated expenditure limits does not automatically require different LUC rules. But *NRSC*'s approach, and its appreciation for collaborative political speech, nevertheless guides our hand.

“To understand the severity of the First Amendment problem caused by” a restriction on party-coordinated speech, “one must first appreciate the important and

traditional role of political parties during campaigns.” *Id.* at 2415. Though it is fashionable to quote George Washington’s admonition against the “spirit of party,” *see* George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), “[t]he formation of national political parties was almost concurrent with the formation of the Republic itself.” *California Democratic Party v. Jones*, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000). Parties immediately began to play an indispensable role in the national electoral process. By the 1820s, Martin Van Buren structured and professionalized the party concept, joining with Andrew Jackson to create the Democratic Party and the centralized electoral model we recognize today. He did so with the aim of uniting citizens through “party principle,” not “personal preference” or “sectional & personal feelings,” imagining parties as vehicles to prioritize ideals over personalities. Letter from Martin Van Buren to Thomas Ritchie (Jan. 13, 1827) (Library of Congress Van Buren Papers Collection, Series 2). That framework eventually carried Van Buren himself—a slight man whose first language was not even English—to the presidency. *See* Edward L. Widmer, *Martin Van Buren* 6–7 (2005).

Individuals hardly vanished: Andrew Jackson’s populist appeal aided Van Buren’s project. But collective organization—especially at the local party level—dramatically increased voter turnout and engagement: From 1824 to 1840, voter turnout in presidential elections increased from 26 percent to 80 percent. *See* National Archives Center For Legislative Archives, *The Two-Party System: A Revolution in American Politics, 1824 to 1840*, at 11 (2021), <https://perma.cc/97WY-UJWQ>. That shift helped turn abolitionism (or at least the Free Soil movement) into a key plank of the new Republican Party, the second

major political party that remains with us today. *See* Akhil R. Amar, *Born Equal: Remaking America's Constitution* 160 (2025).

Even before Van Buren's time, political parties acted in ways comparable to modern "party-coordinated" advertising. This was especially true in 19th-century presidential elections, where many candidates declined to campaign on their own behalf to avoid accusations of undue showmanship and self-importance. Instead, they worked behind the scenes to coordinate party activities. *See* Richard J. Ellis & Mark Dedrick, *The Presidential Candidate, Then and Now*, 26 *Perspectives on Political Science* 208, 208–11 (2010). In the early 1800s, that included direct party support for newspapers in the form of "working capital, official advertising, and patronage." William Miles, *The People's Voice: An Annotated Bibliography of American Presidential Campaign Newspapers* xxiii–xxiv (1987).

Later, formal party affiliation with newspapers ended, but so-called "campaign newspapers" still coordinated with partisans on all sides, offering outlets for political cartoons, articles by influential party members, or announcements of forthcoming speeches and rallies. Their "use . . . as an effective election tool was a direct outgrowth of the symbiotic relationship between press and political party." *Id.* xxiii. It would have mystified the editors of those papers, and the parties who created and supported them, to imagine a modern statute that distinguished between articles printed with a candidate's blessing, articles penned by the candidate himself, and articles created by the editor on his own.

Indeed, until 1940, when Congress amended the Hatch Act to place a \$3 million annual limit on political party committee expenditures, there was no such thing as a monetary restriction on party speech. *See* Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767, 772 (1940). “For nearly 200 years after the ratification of the First Amendment, parties could spend freely to support their candidates during campaigns and could do so in coordination with the candidates.” *NRSC*, 146 S. Ct. at 2416.

FECA’s strike against parties was one element in a mid-20th century push against political party influence in American politics. Some of the diminution of party influence was initiated by the parties themselves. Internal activism and reforms weakened party influence in the party nominating process. *See* Morris Fiorina, *The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics*, 109 *Daedalus*, No. 3, Summer 1980, at 25, 29. And statutory action placed limits on party spending and fundraising. *See id.* But those changes “diminished [the] relative power of political parties as compared to outside groups,” creating a disquieting shift toward single interest groups and highly visible individual candidates. *NRSC*, 146 S. Ct. at 2413.

C.

To be sure, political parties cannot substitute for candidate speech. In a democracy, voters elect individuals, not parties. But the Supreme Court’s recent campaign-finance decisions tell us that an election is not just about the speech of individual candidates: it is about *collaborative* speech too.

Collaborative speech between candidates and parties serves democracy in at least two important ways: coalition-building and collective responsibility. Parties have

incentives that single-issue groups (or individual candidates) do not share. In a two-party system, parties need to harmonize the views of vastly diverse swathes of Americans, appealing to voters with very different geographic and educational backgrounds. They do this in part by traditional mechanisms like party primaries and nominating conventions, which single-interest groups, with their single-issue focus, cannot employ to the same effect. Thus, by working with candidates, parties synthesize numerous views into highly distinctive (but generic) brands and trademarks that voters recognize and trust. An elephant or a donkey on a campaign poster or television ad often matters as much as the content of the ad itself, and party affiliation allows reasonably informed voting without time-consuming research into individual office-seekers.

Strong collective branding creates collective responsibility. Since parties must synthesize wide-ranging views and localities, they ward off one of the chief threats to our political system—the danger James Madison called “faction,” a group of citizens “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” *See* The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison). A party that allows such a faction to gain the upper hand risks alienating other parts of its coalition. Likewise, an incompetent or scandalous candidate reflects poorly on the party as a whole. And congressional dithering hurts the party in power, not just individual members of Congress.

Political parties check faction in part as an automatic function of their size, the “number of citizens and extent of territory” across which they are scattered. *Id.* That “greater variety” of internal factions keeps any one segment from “being able to outnumber

and oppress the rest.” *Id.* So the big-tent, two party system has the same virtues Madison attributes to a large republic. But the risks of collective responsibility also demand centralized party discipline. Parties clamp down on “[m]en of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs,” who “may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people.” *Id.* Parties avert those threats to their brand by coordinating with candidates, sometimes via the content of coordinated advertising or, more often, by the initial choice to funnel money and efforts toward one candidate over another. That makes party-coordinated collaborative speech a filter to “refine and enlarge the public views.” *Id.*

The collaborative-speech protection candidates and parties enjoy is no constitutional orphan. It is only one manifestation of a broader First Amendment interest in collective speech. Even within the electoral sphere, parties are not the only beneficiaries: *Citizens United* vindicated the collective political speech of corporations and labor unions. *See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010). And beyond the strictly electoral realm, the power of collaborative speech was recognized in the “right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Add to that the right to freedom of association, which was underscored by the Supreme Court in *NAACP v. Alabama* and its progeny. 357 U.S. 449, 460–66 (1958) (freedom of expressive association prevented compelled disclosure of membership lists); *see also Gibson v. Fl. Legis. Investigative Comm’n*, 372 U.S. 539, 549 (1960) (similar); *NAACP v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415, 430–37 (1963) (freedom of association protected NAACP’s right to engage in public interest litigation). Those provisions

demonstrate the importance of collaborative speech as a tool of deliberative democracy well beyond the election-law context.

None of this is to exalt the party over the individual, or to downplay the importance of strong expressions of personal conscience. But it is the very strength of party identity that can make deviation from the party line an often-admirable act. In an odd way, democratic speech needs both the party and the maverick. Political systems that blend and draw upon individual and collective speech are healthier in First Amendment terms than those that prize a single element of speech alone.

D.

After *NRSC*, then, I doubt the First Amendment tolerates FECA's indirect strike against party-coordinated speech any more than it sanctions direct limits on the speech of the candidate himself. "What the First Amendment precludes the government from commanding directly, it also precludes the government from accomplishing indirectly." *Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.*, 497 U.S. 62, 77–78 (1990). The First Amendment would frown upon any law that told candidates, "You may not speak in coordination with your party, and you may not work with your party to place ads via Joint Fundraising Committees, either." Nor could Congress escape First Amendment scrutiny with expenditure limits on that speech. But discriminatory LUC rules present an indirect version of that same burden by penalizing candidates for favoring collaborative speech over solo self-promotion.

“When a law burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.” *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n*, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995). That test is the one generally applied to expenditure limits, *see McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n*, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014) (plurality opinion), and an anti-party discriminatory LUC scheme burdens expenditures. So exacting scrutiny seems like the proper standard here, especially because “the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker's identity.” *Citizens United*, 558 U.S. at 350 (2010).

But the choice of standard, as in *NRSC*, is academic. Whatever the correct level of scrutiny, there is simply no government interest that could justify an indirect version of the burdens on “the important and traditional role of political parties during campaigns” the Supreme Court already invalidated. *NRSC*, 146 S. Ct. at 2415. As *NRSC* points out, a *per se* interest in reducing campaign spending “is a flatly impermissible basis for restricting speech.” *Id.* at 2417. The goal of preventing undue party influence over candidates likewise “does not make any sense” given *NRSC*’s historical exposition of collaborative party-candidate speech. *Id.* at 2418 (quotation omitted). A regulatory-fairness type of interest here will not suffice, either, because neutral application of LUC rates to *both* types of candidate speech—individual and party-coordinated—simply creates more total speech. Both the Democratic and Republican parties are equally able to take advantage of the broader LUC rate as well. The more speech, the merrier, as far as the First Amendment is concerned.

Indeed, the Supreme Court “now recognizes ‘only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.’” *Id.* at 2418 (quoting *McCutcheon*, 572 U.S. at 206–07). But no bond connects quid pro quo corruption to discriminatory LUC rules. If anything, collaborative speech is *less* likely to involve corruption because, as *NRSC* explained, the party filter works like a hedge against the pursuit of undue or malevolent influence by single-issue groups or powerful donors over a single candidate. *See id.* at 2419. And Congress possesses numerous other anti-corruption weapons more narrowly tailored to the task at hand. Such prophylactics, *NRSC* noted, include “earmarking” laws—laws that subject contributions “in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit,” like a party, to contribution limits. *Id.* at 2420–21. Here, as in *NRSC*, limits on party-coordinated spending are not justified by a desire to prevent earmarking; the earmarking laws already do that job, and any desire to heap “prophylaxis upon prophylaxis upon prophylaxis” does not overcome the First Amendment. *Id.* at 2423.

IV.

We lack jurisdiction over this case. A staff decision presently awaiting agency review is hardly “final.” That should end our inquiry.

Instead of respecting the basic separation of powers, the majority manufactures jurisdiction to abrogate a federal agency process it finds inconvenient. I understand that agencies often deserve judicial skepticism, but Congress is not bereft of power to mandate compliance with the agency procedures it creates. The majority also conjures up final agency orders through such means as “constructive” agency denials and agency briefs

before this court. Maj. Op. at 27–29. These stratagems are no substitute for full agency deliberations and explanations. To hold them so is to vitiate the very agency accountability the Supreme Court in *Loper Bright* worked so hard to create.

Not content with circumventing the FCC, the majority extends the same treatment to political parties. Its minimization of the party role is at odds with many long years of American political history, and now, after *NRSC*, equally at odds with the view of the Supreme Court. *NRSC* sought to rein in an ahistorical, anti-party trend in statutes and jurisprudence, restoring the proper balance between the individual and the collective in our political life. Instead of following the Supreme Court’s lead, the majority adopts a miserly and constitutionally suspect statutory construction of “use” by a “candidate,” needlessly restricting political speech in the sensitive period leading up to an election.

I would not neuter a federal agency and seize imaginary jurisdiction only to disfavor the place of political parties in our democratic dialogue and to dampen the vigor of pre-election political speech. I respectfully dissent.



EXHIBIT C

TheDesk.net

Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

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Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 26A274

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE, ET AL. *v.* SHERROD
BROWN, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[September 4, 2026]

PER CURIAM.

On March 30, 2026, the Media Bureau, a division of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), issued a “public notice” concerning the FCC’s lowest unit charge (LUC) requirements. Pursuant to those requirements, “[t]he charges made for the use of any broadcasting station by any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office in connection with his campaign” must be set at favorable rates known as the “lowest unit charge” in the weeks leading up to primary and general elections. 47 U. S. C. §315(b)(1)(A). The notice stated that political candidates, joint fundraising committees with noncandidate members, and political parties engaged in coordinated political activity were all entitled to the LUC subject to certain conditions.

On April 29, 2026, four Democratic candidates for Congress filed an application for review with the FCC, arguing that only political candidates were entitled to the LUC and asking the full Commission to set aside the public notice as unlawful. Two months later, while their application was still pending before the Commission, the candidates filed a petition for review against the FCC and the United States in the Fourth Circuit seeking the same relief. With the LUC requirements scheduled to take effect on September 4, 2026 ahead of the upcoming midterm elections, the Fourth

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Circuit expedited briefing and oral argument. It also allowed the National Republican Congressional Committee and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (collectively, the party committees) to participate as intervenors. For their part, the FCC, the United States, and the party committees argued that the Fourth Circuit lacked statutory jurisdiction to consider the petition for review while the candidates' application for review was still pending before the Commission. They also defended the notice on the merits.

On August 25, 2026, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction, granted the candidates' petition for review, and set aside the public notice. The Fourth Circuit then denied the party committees' motion for a stay pending disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari, and the mandate issued.

The party committees now seek a stay from this Court. To succeed, they must show "(1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay." *Hollingsworth v. Perry*, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (*per curiam*). In close cases, we "balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the respondent." *Ibid.* We grant the application.

On the first two factors, the Communications Act makes clear that an aggrieved party must wait for the Commission to resolve its application for review by order before filing a petition for judicial review. To start, the Act provides that "[t]he filing of an application for review . . . shall be a condition precedent to judicial review of any order, decision, report, or action made or taken pursuant to a delegation." 47 U. S. C. §155(c)(7). It continues that "[t]he time within which a petition for [judicial] review must be filed . . . shall be computed from the date upon which public notice is given

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of orders disposing of all applications for review filed in any case.” *Ibid.*; see also 28 U. S. C. §2344 (“On the entry of a final order reviewable under this chapter, the agency shall promptly give notice thereof by service or publication in accordance with its rules. Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.”). The Commission is required to resolve every application it receives. 47 U. S. C. §155(c)(4). The Communications Act thus contemplates that an aggrieved party will file an application for review with the Commission, that the Commission will resolve that application by order, and that public notice of that order will issue before an aggrieved party may petition for further review in federal court.

Because the candidates’ application for review was pending when they filed their petition for review, the Fourth Circuit likely lacked statutory jurisdiction to address their challenge. Its holding to the contrary splits with every other Circuit to have considered the issue. *Council Tree Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 503 F.3d 284, 287 (CA3 2007); *Alabama Power Co. v. FCC*, 311 F.3d 1357, 1366 (CA11 2002); *International Telecard Assn. v. FCC*, 166 F.3d 387, 388 (CA DC 1999) (*per curiam*). Accordingly, the first and second stay factors weigh in favor of granting the application.

The party committees have also demonstrated that they will likely suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. They represent that, in light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision—which the Fourth Circuit likely lacked jurisdiction to issue—broadcasters are already rescinding favorable rates. Current and future rescissions will require the party committees to pay more for advertising space, thereby hampering their efforts to reach the electorate in the critical weeks leading up to the midterms. That injury, which implicates their First Amendment rights to speak and coordinate their political activities freely, *National Republican Senatorial*

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Committee v. FEC, 609 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2026) (slip op., at 7–10), cannot be remedied after the fact through refunds or reimbursements. Like the first and second stay factors, the third factor thus warrants granting the application.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the application for stay presented to THE CHIEF JUSTICE and by him referred to the Court is granted. The mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in case No. 26–1785 is recalled and stayed pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

It is so ordered.

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JACKSON, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 26A274

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE, ET AL. *v.* SHERROD
BROWN, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[September 4, 2026]

JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.

I would deny the stay. In my view, the applicants are not likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that the Fourth Circuit lacked statutory jurisdiction. See *Brown v. FCC*, ____ F. 4th ____, ____ (CA4 2026) (Wynn, J., concurring), App. 55 (concluding there is statutory jurisdiction on constructive-denial grounds because “an agency may not reserve to itself the power to defeat judicial review through delay or inaction”); see also *Santos-Zacaria v. Garland*, 598 U. S. 411, 417 (2023) (explaining that the Court “routinely” treats threshold requirements claimants must complete before filing a lawsuit as “nonjurisdictional” and has “yet to hold that any statutory exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional” (internal quotation marks omitted)).